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ALEXANDER TSESIS
The Supreme Court recently limited Congress's ability to pass civil
rights statutes for the protection of fundamental rights. Decisions striking
sections of the Violence Against Women Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act focused on states' sovereign immunity. These holdings
inadequately analyzed how the Reconstruction Amendments altered
federalism by making the federal government primarily responsible for
protecting civil rights. The Supreme Court also overlooked principles of
liberty and equality lying at the foundation of American governance. The
Court's restrictions on legislative authority to identify fundamental rights
and to safeguard them runs counter to the central credo of American
governance that all three branches of government are responsible for
protecting individual rights for the general welfare.
This Article examines the central principles of American governance.
It first analyzes the role of liberty and equality in the founding generation's
legal thought. It then reflects on how abolitionists adopted these principles
and argued for their universal applicability. Abolitionist theories then
entered the Constitution through the Reconstruction Amendments, which
granted Congress the power to secure the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship against arbitrary abuses. Since the late nineteenth
century, however, the Court has diminished the potential uses of these
amendments. Several Rehnquist Court decisions, such as United States v.
Morrison and Board of Trustees v. Garrett, are indicative of the continuing
constraint on legislative civil rights authority.
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Principled Governance: The American Creed and
Congressional Authority
ALEXANDER TSESIS *
I. INTRODUCTION
A series of high profile Supreme Court cases recently found several
provisions of civil rights laws unconstitutional. The most prominent of
these statutes were the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)1 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 The Court decided that Congress
had overstepped its Fourteenth Amendment authority by passing
prophylactic legislation. It restricted legislative authority to the passage of
statutes responsive to past state infractions against judicially established
fundamental interests.3 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the majority explained
that Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to
"remedial" statutes.4 Unlike the judiciary, the legislative branch lacks "the
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions
on the States." 5
This jurisprudential approach emphasizes the Supreme Court's lone
authority to identify and explicate the nature of fundamental rights.6 That
judicial exclusivity diminishes the value public input can play in
identifying fundamental rights.
7
* Assistant Professor, Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law. I am deeply indebted to
Aviam Soifer, Mark Tushnet, Sanford Levinson, Herbert Hovenkamp, Margaret L. Moses, Andrew
Taslitz, Jerry E. Norton, Gregory Shaffer, Robert Kaczorowski, Robert C. Post, Charmaine Stanislaw,
Andrew Siegel, Margalit Cohen Keene Tocher, Andrew Epstein, Spencer Waller, and John Bronsteen
for their advice and comments during various stages of writing.
1United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 605 (2000).
2 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
3 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66, 86 (2000) (denying Congress the power
to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state actors); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 511, 532 (1997) (finding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional, in part, because
the statute was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior").
4 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
5 1d.
6 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section Five, 13 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 485, 486 (2004) ("The Rehnquist Court's approach to Section Five leaves no
room for Congress to independently interpret the Fourteenth Amendment....1").
See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 252 (2002) ("While the courts remained
responsible for declaring the boundaries, it was recognized that the Constitution contemplated room for
the political actors to give substantive meaning within those boundaries."); Frank B. Cross, Institutions
and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1529, 1536 (2000) (arguing that there lacks
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The Constitution does not explicitly name many of the core American
rights, such as the right to privacy8 and the right to travel, 9 which the
judiciary has identified. The Ninth Amendment states that the Bill of
Rights is a non-exhaustive list of interests that the people retain against
governmental interference.' 0  While the Reconstruction Amendments
expanded federal power to secure essential liberties," the constitutional
change did not diminish states' control over most internal legal issues, such
as those arising in torts and contracts. Like the Ninth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not include a full list of interests protected by
its Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 12  Each generation of
Americans has helped to define these ambiguous provisions. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter pointed out, "[g]reat concepts like . . . 'due process of
law,' 'liberty,' [and] 'property' were purposely left to gather meaning from
experience."' 3 The topic of this Article is the extent to which Congress can
rely on legislative devices, such as task forces and committee hearings,
independent of previous judicial findings to identify fundamental rights
and then pass legislation safeguarding them.
Multiple perspectives on the nature of rights have been available at all
stages of American history. 14 The protections of civil and political rights
contained in the Declaration of Independence, Preamble to the
Constitution, Bill of Rights, Reconstruction Amendments, and a number of
other constitutional provisions are practical manifestations of a rights-
based tradition that is traceable to the nation's founding. Unlike a number
a "very strong case for exclusive or even primary reliance on judicial enforcement of the Bill of
Rights").
" Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (applying sexual privacy right to gays and
lesbians); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (recognizing a right to reproductive privacy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending Griswold to the unmarried); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (establishing that it is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy to
intrude into marital contraceptive decisions).
9 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (holding that the right to travel derives from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1972)
(holding that freedom to wander and stroll is protected under the Constitution); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1966) (finding that the Commerce Clause protects free movement); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1965) (finding the right to travel in the Fifth Amendment); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) ("Thus among the rights and privileges of National citizenship
recognized by this court [is] the right to pass freely from State to State .. "); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (holding that the right to travel derives from the Privileges and Immunities
Clause ).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
1 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
'2 U.S. CONST. amends. IX, XIV, § 1.
13 Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
1" See MICHAEL FOLEY, AMERICAN CREDO: THE PLACE OF IDEAS IN POLITICS 6-9 (2007)
(discussing various perspectives and traditions over the course of United States history).
[Vol. 41:679
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of prominent legal thinkers, 15 I believe that there is a fairly stable
American Creed that all three branches of government must follow.' 6 This
is not to deny the multiplicity of human, fiscal, and political values in a
pluralistic society. My claim, rather, is that the nation has retained a civil
rights ethos traceable to its founding documents against which
governmental conduct can be analyzed.
Even though the American Creed has often been violated by
discrimination involving gender, religion, race, and national origin, it
provides an ideological cornerstone for civil rights reforms. For example,
Abraham Lincoln believed that "the equality of men" had been a "central
idea" permeating American "public opinion" since the Revolutionary
Period. 17 While manifold inequalities have plagued the United States, they
have not halted the "steady progress toward the practical equality of all
men."' 18 Human equality "is the great fundamental principle upon which
our free institutions rest."' 9 An American sociologist and historian, W. E.
B. DuBois, explained that for the "clique of political philosophers to which
Jefferson belonged" slavery was irreconcilable with the country's claim of
independence. 20  E. B. Reuter, writing in DuBois's Phylon journal,
proclaimed that the "American Creed" is a
body of ideals, held alike by the members of all races,
classes, and creeds, that makes America great. But the creed
is not lived up to; it is put in the laws that are ignored. This
conflict between status and ideals is central in all phases of
the Negro problem.2'
IS See infra text accompanying notes 301-05, 309-13, 314-18, and 339-43 for a discussion of
Supreme Court decisions restricting congressional power in order to protect civil rights.
16 My understanding of the American Creed is similar to Gunnar Myrdal's:
[T]here is evidently a strong unity in this nation and a basic homogeneity...
in its valuations. Americans of all national origins, classes, regions, creeds, and
colors have something in common: a social ethos, a political creed. It is difficult to
avoid the judgment that this 'American Creed' is the cement in the structure of this
great and disparate nation.
GUNNAR MYRDAL, I AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 3
(2d ed. 1944). The difference between our approaches is that Myrdal is focused on race, while I think
the American Creed of civic equality extends to any group, including gender, nationality, and religious
groups. Further, while he speaks in terms of social ethos, I think the American Creed is also
instrumental to constitutional and legislative progress. See Nahum Z. Medalia, Myrdal's Assumptions
on Race Relations: A Conceptual Commentary, 40 SOC. FORCES 223, 224 (1962) (noting Myrdal's
emphasis on race relations and assertion of a social ethos).
17 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at a Republican Banquet, Chicago, Illinois (Dec. 10, 1856), in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, at 385 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
8 id
19 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James N. Brown (Oct. 18, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, at 327 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
20 W. E. B. DUBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 48 (1896).
21 E. B. Reuter, The American Dilemma, 5 PHYLON 114, 115 (1944) (book review). DuBois's
praise for Myrdal's book appeared in the pages following Reuter's review. Id. at 121-24. It should be
2009] PRINCIPLED GOVERNANCE
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Martin Luther King, Jr. adopted such an understanding in his famous 1963
speech at the Lincoln Memorial. He affirmed that his hope for an equitable
society was "deeply rooted in the American dream .... [T]hat one day this
nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal."'
22
Yet Rogers M. Smith has recently popularized the contrary view that
prejudicial, "ascriptive" systems of governance have been as much part of
the American tradition as has the liberal democratic model.23  Smith is
undoubtedly correct that the unequal treatment of women, blacks, Native
Americans, Jews, Catholics, Irish, Japanese, and others riddles the pages of
United States' history. On my account, however, these were deviations
from, not manifestations of, core American commitments. At all stages of
American history, racism, chauvinism, and other forms of intolerance have
been present. Reformers have nevertheless linked their efforts to the
Declaration's and Preamble's statements on universal rights. This Article
argues that the founding principle of civic equality has repeatedly forced
the nation to look inwardly at its shortcomings, has inspired resistance
movements, and has forced constitutional change. The Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause grants legislators the power to play an
active role in seeking to rectify past harms and to avoid committing new
ones.
24
Each generation reinterprets the principle of liberal equality through
the "stream of history," to borrow Justice Frankfurter's term.25 In the
words of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, progress occurs because "[a] prime
part of the history of our Constitution ... is the story of the extension of
constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded.,
26
President Franklin D. Roosevelt explained that the Declaration of
Independence is a contract with the people who consented to being
governed in exchange for protections of those rights: "The task of
statesmanship has always been the re-definition of these rights in terms of
added, of course, that much the same failure to achieve explicit governmental goals has harmed a
number of other groups who face systemic discrimination.
22 Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Lincoln Memorial (Aug. 28, 1963), available at
http://www.usconstitution.net/dream.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
23 ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 35-39 (1997); Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville,
Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549 (1993).
24 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (claiming that Congress's power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides it with the ability to adopt measures to enforce the
guarantees of that amendment).
25 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 2 (1937); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
43 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that the Constitution is a "living framework of
government designed for an undefined future").
26 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 & n.21 (1996) (citing RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE
FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987)).
[Vol. 41:679
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a changing and growing social order. 27
I believe that the continuing development of nationally recognized
fundamental rights is not predicated on John Hart Ely's "neutral and
durable principle. 28  Nor are "substantive federal constitutional rights
draw[n] .. .exclusively from the great body of relevant Supreme Court
decisions," as Larry Yackle would have it.
29
This Article seeks to demonstrate that contrary to the Court's recent
holdings, Congress has the prerogative to identify interests that are
intrinsic in the American Creed. I argue that any statute that expands
rights must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose but
should not be subject to the strict scrutiny analysis applicable to laws that
place limits on rights.
Thus civil rights statutes granting federal government jurisdiction over
discriminatory conduct, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,30 the Age
Discrimination Employment Act,31 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act,32 are legitimate means for furthering the overall purpose of American
government. Supreme Court cases that have significantly constrained
Congress's ability to identify substantive rights do not give adequate
consideration to how much the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
increased legislative power to define and maintain a national standard of
liberal equality against arbitrary state discriminations.
Part II of this Article discusses the concepts of liberty and of equality
during the Revolutionary Period. It emphasizes the early understanding of
the national statements of purpose in the Declaration of Independence and
the Preamble to the Constitution. It also discusses the constitutional
compromises that failed to achieve the stated ends of national government.
This historical background is critical to understanding the roots of
American civil rights principles. Part III turns to several abolitionist views
about the existence of a national obligation to protect rights. Those
constitutional theories became particularly influential during debates about
the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments which granted Congress
the power to pass laws securing rights intrinsic to national citizenship.
Debates on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the subjects of
Part IV, explicitly conceived Congress would have the enforcement power
to pass principled legislation to protect human dignitary interests. As Part
27 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
753 (1938).
2 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949
(1973). Another often-cited article relying on neutral principles is Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
9 LARRY YACKLE, REGULATORY RIGHTS: SUPREME COURT ACTrvISM, THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
AND THE MAKING OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (2007).
3042 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)(5)-(a)(6) (2000).
3' 29 U.S.C. §§ 625-26 (2000).
3242 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
2009]
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V recounts, the Court has periodically restrained the reach of these new
congressional powers. Recent Supreme Court decisions, such as United
States v. Morrison and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, have further limited congressional power to protect civil rights.33
The Article concludes with a discussion of congressional power to
safeguard civil rights and the need for judicial deference when reviewing
liberty enhancing statutes.
II. THE STATUS OF RIGHTS AT THE TIME OF THE NATION'S FOUNDING
The original Constitution placed limits on Congress's ability to protect
individual rights.34 Several clauses protected the institution of slavery
against federal interference.35 The Fugitive Slave Clause forbade passage
of any federal emancipation law.36 Another clause required the federal
government to protect states from domestic insurrections, including slave
uprisings.37 The Three-Fifths Clause left states with the latitude to entirely
exclude large segments of the population from government.38
These constitutional provisions undermined the often asserted central
aims of national independence. Although prior to Reconstruction the
equitable statements of governmental purpose found in the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution remained
unenforceable against the states, they nevertheless established a national
ethos. That principle of governance, which the country never fully put into
practice, later became intrinsic to the increased authority the people
granted Congress through the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A. Declaration of Independence
Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence to resonate
33 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Congress was not
authorized under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to require that states abide by the terms of the
Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (finding that
Congress overstepped its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment authority by passing 42
U.S.C. § 13981).
'4 See Frederick Douglass, The Revolution of 1848, Speech at the West India Emancipation
Celebration (Aug. 1, 1848), in THE NORTH STAR, Aug. 4, 1848, reprinted in 1 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: EARLY YEARS, 1817-1849, at 321, 328-29 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950);
Frederick Douglass, in THE NORTH STAR, Apr. 5, 1850, reprinted in VOICES FROM THE GATHERING
STORM: THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 40, 40-41 (Glenn M. Linden ed., 2001);
Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C.
L. REV. 307, 319-22 (2004).
35 See Frederick Douglass, The Constitution & Slavery, in THE NORTH STAR, Mar. 16, 1849,
reprinted in WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 361, 361-67; WENDELL PHILLIPS,
THE CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT 5-7 (1856); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977).
36 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
"7Id art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
3 d. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
[Vol. 41:679
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the political temperament in the colonies. His statement of the "self-
evident" truth that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" distilled the political thought of his
day.39 In drafting the Declaration, Jefferson relied on the contemporary
understanding of universal rights.
Years after independence, two signers of the Declaration highlighted
the document's reliance on established colonial thought. Richard Henry
Lee and John Adams drew attention to the Declaration's lack of originality.
Jefferson, in turn, responded that he meant for it to reflect the invigorating
spirit of the times rather than to express his personal views.40  Lee, a
delegate to the first Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration,
claimed that Jefferson "copied from Locke's treatise on government. ' ,
John Locke, whose political philosophy profoundly influenced American
revolutionaries, insisted that persons "by nature, [are] all free, equal and
independent., 42  The erudite Adams, almost surely the most powerful
figure at the Continental Congress and later the second President of the
United States, wrote to Timothy Pickering with irritation that there "is not
an idea in" the Declaration "but what had been hackneyed in Congress for
two years before." 43 Jefferson did not dispute Lee's or Adams's assertions.
To the contrary, he explained that he had not aimed "to find out new
principles . . . to say things which had never been said before[,] but to
place before mankind the common sense of the subject" that reflected the
"sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters,
printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right."" The preamble
to the Declaration established an enduring legacy of principles for the
United States.
Jefferson elegantly rendered the newborn nation's commitment to
39 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
4o Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 342, 343 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899) (explaining that the Declaration of Independence
"was intended to be an expression of the American mind").
41 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823), in id at 266, 267-68.
42 JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, in
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 193, 279 (6th ed. 1764). Despite this statement, Locke was not as
equalitarian as he seems to be from his Essay. In 1669, he drafted a constitution for the colony of
South Carolina that prohibited interference with black slavery. See Jonathan A. Bush, Free to Enslave:
The Foundations of Colonial American Slave Law, 5 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 417, 421 (1993); Paul
Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2063, 2075 (1993); Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of
Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REv. 539, 593 n.498 (2002).
43 Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering (Aug. 6, 1822), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 512, 514 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850).
" Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 40, at 342, 343.
2009]
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safeguard fundamental rights.45  Daniel Webster, one of the best known
politicians of the nineteenth century, believed Americans had plenty of
reason to praise Jefferson for providing "the title-deed of their liberties."
46
Similarly, in modem times Martin Luther King, Jr. stated that the
Constitution and Declaration constituted "promissory note[s]" to secure
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.47
The Declaration made clear that independence from British colonial
rule entailed protecting the people against arbitrary infringements of rights
intrinsic to humanity.48 The ideology which inspired future generations to
action was itself the product of "an ideological-constitutional struggle."
49
Historian Bernard Bailyn's rigorous analysis of revolutionary pamphlets
revealed that colonists acted out of "fear of a comprehensive conspiracy
against liberty."5° Those pamphlets evince "motive and understanding" to
create a constitutional system designed to safeguard the "inalienable,
indefeasible rights inherent in all people by virtue of their humanity."
51
The resulting ideas evolved in unpredictable ways throughout the federal
and state constitution-making processes.52
From the many statements about the value of liberty and the
government's obligation to protect rights emerged a genuinely humanistic
reason for gaining independence. This historical background indicates
John Hart Ely was too dismissive in thinking the Declaration to be "a
brief' that harnessed "arguments of every hue," even those without any
support in "positive law."53 Jefferson expressed the contrary view in an
1825 letter to James Madison, placing the Declaration among three of the
"best guides" for ascertaining the "distinctive principles of the Government
of our own State [Virginia], and of. . . the [United] States. 54 In 1794,
Samuel Adams, serving as the Acting Governor of Massachusetts after
45 For detail about how Thomas Jefferson became increasingly tolerant of slavery, see
ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE LAW 29-30
(2008).
4 Daniel Webster, Adams and Jefferson: Discourse in Commemoration of the Lives and Services
of John and Thomas Jefferson, Delivered in Faneuil Hall (Aug. 2, 1826), available at
http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/grizzard/ellis/eellis09.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
47 Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), available at
http://www.juntosociety.com/hist-speeches/mlkihad.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
48 But see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 87 (1977); M. E. BRADFORD, A BETTER
GUIDE THAN REASON 41 (1979) (rejecting the constitutional significance of the Declaration).
49 Bernard Bailyn, Introduction to PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, at
viii (1965).
'
0 Id. at x.
51 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION x, 184-85
(1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52 Gordon S. Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 21
(1966).53 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 49 (1980).
54 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 218, 221 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
[Vol. 41:679
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John Hancock's death, told both branches of the state's congress that when
"the Representatives of the United States of America" agreed "all men are
created equal, and are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights," they proclaimed "the doctrine of liberty and equality" to be the
"political creed of the United States."55
As a heuristic device, the Declaration was a product of its time, and its
significance to ascertaining the congressional role in establishing
fundamental rights can only be understood by placing it into the
perspective of revolutionary philosophy about the function of government.
The writings of Enlightenment philosophers, like Locke, Hugo Grotius,
Samuel Puffendorf and Jean J. Burlamaqui, were at the core of American
revolutionary philosophy.5 6  Their ideas about inalienable rights were
trumpeted by the Declaration. Grotius, for instance, explained that the
well-being of rulers "depends on the Happiness of his Subjects."" A
common desire to avoid harm interlinks governors and subjects. "[T]he
nature of man," Burlamaqui explained, is to pursue happiness.5 Through
this intellectual lens, the revolutionaries considered it only natural for
every individual to seek what is good and agreeable for "preservation,
perfection, entertainment, and pleasure." 59  Locke also linked the
"[floundation of [l]iberty ' 60 to the "earnest and constant ...pursuit of
happiness."'6 1 Because the "preferable good" might not be immediately
achieved, our immediate desires must sometimes be suspended.
Individuals willingly relinquish some license to act impetuously in
exchange for the long-term benefits of being members of a civil society
beholden to the people's "preservation, perfection, entertainment, and
pleasure.63 A representative government's primary purpose is to increase
the happiness and prosperity of individuals. 64
There was a near consensus among natural law philosophers about the
purposes of polity. William Wollaston, who wrote a popular treatise on
natural religion, found that "[t]he end of society is the common welfare
55 Speech of Samuel Adams, in Domestic Occurrences, MASS. MAG., Jan. 1794, at 59, 62-64.
56 BAILYN, supra note 51, at 27. Alexander Hamilton recommended that an opponent "attend
diligently" to the writings of "Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Burlamaqui."
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED: FOR A MORE IMPARTIAL AND COMPREHENSIVE
VIEW OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAINAND THE COLONIES 5 (1775).
57 I HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 106 (W. Innys et al. eds., 1738) (1625).
58 JEAN J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 39 (5th ed. 1791) (1748).
'9 Id. at41.
60 JOHN LOCKE, I AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 348 (Alexander Campell
Fraser ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1894) (1689).6 1 
Id. at 342.62 
Id. at 348.
63 BURLAMAQUI, supra note 58, at 41.
64 BENJAMIN TRUMBULL, DISCOURSE, DELIVERED AT THE ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE
FREEMEN OF THE TOWN OF NEW-HAVEN 27 (1773).
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and good of the people associated."65 In almost identical terms, chemist
Joseph Priestley claimed that "[t]he great object of civil society is the
happiness of the members of it.'6 The value of "safety and happiness of
society," to which Madison gave homage in the Federalist Papers, was
grounded in "the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God., 67 He
was willing to be flexible on the structure of government, so long as it
provided "for the safety, liberty and happiness of the Community.,
68
Government's role, according to an English polemicist, was to serve the
public good since our happiness is dependent on society.69
The government as a whole, without distinction of judiciary and
legislative branches, was to further "the happiness of the society., 70 The
purpose of creating a union of states, as the Declaration of Independence
put it, was "to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness. 71 In very similar terms,
Ebenezer Bridge, from the pulpit, told the governor of Massachusetts Bay
that a compact among natural equals voluntarily bound them to "just
regulation[s]" tended to better "promote[] and secure[]" the "happiness of
men.
72
The legitimacy of governmental regulation could be tested against its
ability to protect the people's intrinsic interests. John Hancock, who had
become governor of Massachusetts in 1780, regarded American federalism
as a system "founded in the ideas of natural equality" that enabled its
members "to seek their own happiness as a community., 73 His fellow
Massachusettsian, Samuel Adams, believed that the colonists' "declaration
of their Independence" was born of their desire to better protect natural
rights, such as those in property and the pursuit of personal happiness.74
65 WILLIAM WOLLASTON, THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED 273 (8th ed. 1759) (1722)
(emphasis omitted).
66 JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 94 (2d ed. 1771)
(1768).
67 THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 297 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
68 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 53 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
69 HENRY ST. JOHN VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, LETTERS ON THE SPIRIT OF PATRIOTISM 5, 7, 11-
12,21 (Philadelphia, Franklin & Hall 1749).
70 JAMES WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE AND THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT 3 (Philadelphia, Bradfords 1774). The peoples' will could
limit the government's authority. JOHN TUCKER, A SERMON PREACHED AT CAMBRIDGE, BEFORE HIS
EXCELLENCY THOMAS HUTCHINSON 13-14 (Boston, Draper 1771).
71 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
72 EBENEZER BRIDGE, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE HIS EXCELLENCY FRANCIS BERNARD 14
(Boston, Green & Russell 1767).
73 JOHN HANCOCK, RESOLVES OF THE GENERAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETrS 39 (Boston, Adams 1792).
74 Samuel Adams, Domestic Occurrences: Speech to Fellow Citizens of the Two Branches of the
Legislature (Jan. 17, 1794), reprinted in MASS. MAG., Jan. 1794, at 59, 62-63. Adams was elected
Governor of Massachusetts later that month.
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Adams went a step further by recognizing the citizens' entitlement "to an
equal share of all the social rights," not merely political and civil ones.75
An anti-Federalist similarly held that persons join to form governments for
strength of security, which is needed for "the greatest acquir[ing]" of
"benefits" with the "least sacrifice.7 6 Reaping the benefits of living in a
community of equals required making some sacrifices for the sake of unity.
Without a civil government, wrote an author in 1770, "clashing interests
and violence" would endanger "[i]mportant... rights of mankind." 7 They
included the rights to a "safe and unmolested enjoyment of life, liberty and
property, and to the best improvement of all their powers, with every
reasonable and equitable advantage they have to promote their present and
everlasting welfare. 78 Governments that function against the people's will
become the "public fountains of oppression and injustice., 79 To achieve
overall public happiness, aristocratic privilege had to be eradicated.
In 1778, British political philosopher Richard Price claimed the maxim
"that all men are naturally equal" required government to treat all people
"grown up to maturity" as "independent agents, capable of acquiring
property, and of directing their own conduct., 80  The children of both
peasants and noblemen deserved a government committed to the "equal
rights [of] the subjects. 81  If the "natural equality of mankind" were to
mean anything, remarked a future governor of New York, it required the
government to mete out the same "measure of justice .. .to all men.",82
Moral rights arising from the liberty and humanity of "all brethren" are
identical for all no matter what their intellectual and physical differences.83
The unequal treatment of blacks, women, religious minorities,
foreigners, and Native Americans plagued an American nation that claimed
to be a bastion against tyranny and despotism. 84  Thus, the formulated
ideology was universal in its application, but the privileged position of
landed and money interests kept power in the hands of a few. Living up to
" Id. at 62-63.
76 Essays by The Impartial Examiner No. 1 (Feb. 20, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 172, 176 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); see also Letters of Cato No. 3, in id. at 101, 109-
10 ("The freedom, equality, and independence which you enjoyed by nature, induced you to consent to
a political power.").
77 STEPHEN JOHNSON, INTEGRITY AND PIETY THE BEST PRINCIPLES OF A GOOD ADMINISTRATION
OF GOVERNMENT 5-6 (New London, Green 1770).
8 Id. at 5.
79 TRUMBULL, supra note 64, at 32.80 RICHARD PRICE, ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF CIVIL LIBERTY,
AND THE WAR WITH AMERICA 12 (1778).
81 ROBERT CORAM, POLITICAL INQUIRIES 87 (Wilmington, Andrews & Brynberg 1791).
82 DEWIrr CLINTON, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE HOLLAND LODGE 8 (New York, Childs
& Swaine 1794) (emphasis omitted).
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., JOHN SHIPPEN, AN ORATION DELIVERED ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SCIENTIFIC
SOCIETY 11 (Philadelphia, Bailey 1794) (lauding America for having shed the yoke of British
oppression and thereby becoming the "happiest nation in the world").
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their founding ideals would have required putting an end to arbitrary
discrimination, the worst of which was slavery, and to privileges based
solely on immutable biological characteristics, such as race and gender.
In fact, the Revolutionaries were not blind to the incompatibility of
slavery with their stated commitment to equality.85  Long before the
opening salvos at Lexington and Concord, Samuel Pufendorf had rejected
the "absurdity ... of some men's being slaves by nature. 86 Such a view,
he said, was "directly repugnant to ... natural Equality."87 It would have
been a monumental thing had Congress risen to the challenge of
identifying liberty as a fundamental right violated by slavery.
Many revolutionaries recognized the incompatibility of slavery to their
philosophical statements about natural equality. The "American in
Algiers," who referred to the Declaration of Independence as "the fabric of
the rights of man," faulted those who had bound Africans to slavery even
as they enjoyed "the Rights of Man.,88 He put the point in verse:
What then, and are all men created free,
And Afric's sons continue slave to be,
And shall that hue our native climates gave,
Our birthright forfeit, and ourselves enslave?
Are we not made like you of flesh and blood,
Like you some wise, some fools, some bad, some good?
In short, are we not men? and if we be,
By your own declaration we are free.89
Critics of the Revolution drew attention to the disconnect between
humanistic statements of national purpose and institutionalized racial
inequality.90
Many American patriots similarly based their indictment of slavery on
what they considered American principles. In this vein, New Jersey
85 Few revolutionaries were similarly far sighted about gender inequality. One of the rare tracts of
that period advocating women's rights was MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS
OF WOMEN (1792). Jefferson took a more paternalistic perspective. He asserted that civilization
safeguarded "women in the enjoyment of their natural equality" by demanding that "the stronger sex"
"subdue the selfish passions, and to respect those rights in others which we value in ourselves."
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 64 (1788). Missing from this statement is any
conception of what role the state should take in securing women's rights.
86 SAMUEL PUFFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE & NATIONS 230 (5th ed., tr. Basil Kennet, 1749)
(1672).
87 id.
88 THE AMERICAN IN ALGIERS, OR THE PATRIOT OF SEVENTY-SIX IN CAPTIVITY 23-24 (New
York, Buel 1797).
89 Id at 24-25.
90 See, e.g., Criticism, THE PORT FOLIO, Mar. 28, 1801, at 98-99.
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Quaker leader David Cooper underscored the contradiction between
principles of equality and slavery by publishing revolutionary dogma in a
left-hand column and condemning American practices on the right.9' The
Declaration made much of self-evident truths which must apply to all of
humanity, he noted, but "the very people who make these pompous
declarations are slave-holders. 92  Cooper also realized that foreigners
would condemn Americans for demanding respect for "their own rights as
freemen" while "holding thousands and tens of thousands of their innocent
fellow men in the most debasing and abject slavery., 93 All people, he
declared, had the same rights irrespective of race: "By the immutable laws
of nature, we are equally entitled to life, liberty and property with our
lordly masters, and have never ceded to any power whatever, a right to
deprive us thereof."94  Cooper further juxtaposed a 1774 Continental
Congress resolution, proclaiming the colonies' commitment to the
"immutable laws of nature," with the treatment of blacks. 95  Just like
whites, blacks had never ceded, and indeed could not cede, their claim to
the immutable rights of life, liberty, and property. The manifold injustices
perpetrated against them undermined the core political foundation of the
Revolution.96
Early abolitionist societies, which demanded America meet its
obligation to identify and protect universal natural rights, did not conceive
this to be the sole province of the judiciary. It was their view that the
entire government had to put effort into recognizing and ending
oppression. The New Jersey Society for Promoting Abolition extolled "the
principles which animated our forefathers to fly from tyranny and
persecution" and to protect "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," but
criticized them for withholding "those rights from an unfortunate and
degraded class of our fellow creatures." 97 Meanwhile the Pennsylvania
Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery relied on the second
paragraph of the Declaration in its effort to remove "this evil ... from the
land. 98  To a college student, who later became acting president of
Harvard, it was a "matter of painful astonishment" that during such an
9" A SERIOUS ADDRESS TO THE RULERS OF AMERICA, ON THE INCONSISTENCY OF THEIR
CONDUCT RESPECTING SLAVERY: FORMING A CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ENCROACHMENTS OF
ENGLAND ON AMERICAN LIBERTY, AND, AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN TOLERATING SLAVERY 6-13
(Trenton, Collins 1783).
9'Id. at 12.
93 1d. at5.
9'Id. at9.
95 id
9 Id.
97 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW-JERSEY SOCIETY, FOR PROMOTING THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY 3-4 (Isaac Neale, Burlington 1793) (emphasis omitted).
98 CONSTITUTION AND ACT OF INCORPORATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY, FOR
PROMOTING THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AND THE RELIEF OF FREE NEGROES, UNLAWFULLY HELD IN
BONDAGE 34 (J. Ormrod, Philadelphia 1800).
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"enlightened age" which had espoused "the principles of natural and civil
Liberty," those "who are so readily disposed to urge the principles of
natural equality in defence of their own Liberties, should, with so little
reluctance" violate them in their dealings with Africans. 99
The term "rights" was typically subdivided into "natural and
unalienable" rights and "constitutional or fundamental" ones. This
distinction, however, often broke down. Inalienable or fundamental rights
in the United States included property ownership, peaceable worship,
individual security, representation regarding taxation, trial by jury, habeas
corpus, the right to practice religion peaceably, speedy trial, counsel, cross
examination, notice of legal charges, assembly, and freedom of the
press.It° By being part of a representative government, everyone retained
"a share in the legislative, taxative, judicial, and the vindictive powers."''°
The Declaration of Independence's statement on inalienable rights
embodied the widespread colonial belief that people form governments to
protect inherently equal, human interests. There is no indication in the
document that only the judiciary could determine the nature of those rights.
B. Preamble to the Constitution
Like the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution
is a statement of national purpose. The significance of establishing "a
more perfect Union" governed on the basis of "Justice" to "insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, Promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty' 0 2 is as relevant today as it
was in 1787. While the Preamble has never been recognized as an
independent source of rights, it is a key interpretative tool that all three
branches of government must use to meet their responsibilities to the
people.10 3
If the judiciary were to limit Congress's power to provide for the
general welfare, it would overstep its Article III power by restricting the
legislature from carrying out an intrinsic, constitutional obligation. In
determining whether the Court's recent decisions have unconstitutionally
limited congressional civil rights authority, which this Article discusses in
THEODORE PARSONS & ELIPHALET PEARSON, A FORENSIC DISPUTE ON THE LEGALITY OF
ENSLAVING THE AFRICANS 4 (John Boyle, Boston 1773). Parsons defended the pro-slavery position,
while Pearson advocated against slavery.
10o ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 51-53
(1788).
101 AMERICA'S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 7 (Ebenezer Watson, Hartford 1775).
'02 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
103 See, e.g., LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 955 (5th Cir. 1970) (Gewin, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The preamble to the Constitution does not purport to guarantee individual
rights, but it does set forth what this union of states is all about. It does not limit the Bill of Rights but
it does serve as a key to an interpretation of the responsibilities involved as well as the rights therein
conferred and secured.").
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Part V, it is important to determine how best to understand the Preamble's
statement of legitimate governmental goals.
Following the Preamble's introduction, the Constitution establishes the
structure of government and then-through the Bill of Rights and later
Amendments-enumerates some of the nationally recognized individual
interests. An eighteenth century author regarded the "preamble" to be "the
key of the Constitution."'04 He urged the people to reject the exercise of
any federal authority "contrary to the spirit breathed by this
introduction. 10 5 While the Preamble lacks an explicit enforcement clause,
any legislation, executive action, or judicial decision that espouses a view
contrary to the Preamble violates the Constitution's aspirations for
tranquility through national unity. What the Preamble lacks in a specific
positive grant of power, it makes up for by channeling the objects of all
three branches of government to the achievement of the common good by
safeguarding individual liberties.
The Preamble remains one of the least parsed portions of the
Constitution. 10 6 Justice John Marshall Harlan's statement in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, upholding the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
vaccination law, proclaimed that the Preamble "has never been regarded as
the source of any substantive power .... Such powers embrace only those
expressly granted in the body of the Constitution and as much may be
implied from those so granted."' 0 7 Despite this limiting assertion, Harlan
recognized the Preamble's value as an interpretive tool, "the general
purposes for which the people ordained and established the
Constitution."' 08  Similarly, in his classic treatise on the Constitution,
Joseph Story asserted that while the Preamble does not confer explicit
powers like other parts of the Constitution, lawmakers must look to it for
"the nature, and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred by
the constitution . . . . "109 Despite its foundational place in the Constitution,
the Preamble has rarely played any substantive role in judicial
interpretations.
In a much-studied twentieth century case about the procedural rights of
welfare recipients, the Court relied on the Preamble for the proposition
that, "Public assistance... is not mere charity, but a means to 'promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
104 A NATIVE OF VIRGINIA, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 10 (1788).
105 Id
106 See Robert J. Peaslee, Our National Constitution: The Preamble, 9 B.U. L. REV. 2, 13 (1929)
(concerning the relatively few mentions of the Preamble during the state ratifying conventions).
107 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
18 Id
109 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 445 (1833).
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Posterity."'110  The rationale was based both on welfare recipients'
procedural entitlement to pre-termination hearings and on indigent persons
right to enjoy "the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community.""' This formulation
not only echoed the language of the Preamble but also the national aims of
the Declaration. That is, the government is required to provide certain
procedural rights to welfare recipients safeguarding the basic liberty of
equals to pursue happiness in their lives.
The dearth of similar judicial expositions of the Preamble" 2 makes a
historical review of its constitutional function the most fruitful line of
investigation into its significance. Such a study of archival sources needs
to extend beyond the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787
because little was said there about the Preamble. On the other hand,
contemporary publications and the text itself provide a window into what
duties the Preamble establishes for national governance by statutory,
regulatory, and common law.
To begin, the phrase "We, the People" indicates that the collective
colonial community, rather than state governments, was the source of
national power. To regard the Preamble as pure rhetoric is to dismiss the
idea that the people established the government for a common purpose." 3
To the contrary, Supreme Court Justices from the eighteenth through the
twenty-first centuries have repeatedly recognized the "proposition that the
Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United
States.""14
These collective, abstract "people" share a common interest in
"io Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,265 (1970) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
Id
112 See Milton Handler et al., A Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble
in Constitutional Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 117, 120 n.14 (1990) (discussing the relatively
few cases in which the preamble is mentioned, let alone relied upon, by the Supreme Court).
"13 Not everyone agreed that the Constitution reflected popular will. Patrick Henry, for one,
mocked the claim that the Constitution was a product of "We, the People." HERBERT J. STORING,
WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 12 (1981) (quoting Patrick Henry, Speeches of Patrick
Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 293, 297
(Herbert J. Storing ed. 1985) (emphasis omitted)). For a more recent criticism of the notion that the
Revolution was the product of popular will rather that powerful interests, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTrruTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES 14-18 (1913).
114 See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 528 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Constitution
was ratified by Conventions in the several States, not by the States themselves, a historical fact and a
constitutional imperative which underscore the proposition that the Constitution was ordained and
established by the people of the United States." (citation omitted)); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 786 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that the "'Constitution [was] established by the
people of the United States."' (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 466 (1793) (emphasis
omitted))); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 154 (1886) ("'The United States is a .... great
corporation... ordained and established by the American people."' (quoting United States v. Maurice,
26 F. Cas. 1211, 1216 (D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747) (opinion by Chief Justice Marshall sitting as
designated circuit justice))); Barron v. Mayor of Bait., 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) ("The constitution was
ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government,
and not for the government of the individual states.").
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submitting themselves to a national bond in order to "establish justice,
insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity.""l5 The Preamble makes clear that a primary purpose of forming
a national government was the vindication of liberty rights, something the
founding generation considered intrinsic to the general welfare. 16 In 1791,
the Attorney General of Massachusetts articulated the reasoning behind
"the preamble to the frame of government" as the creation of "a union of
individuals, by which the states are deprived of the power to act as
sovereign states in certain matters... [of like interest] to them all."' 117
"[P]olitical honesty," as a Massachusetts convention on the ratification
of the Constitution interpreted it, was more likely to come from "the body
of the people" rather than "a single person, or a very small number."
'
"18
The states retained independent sovereignty over local matters but the will
of the people, through representatives of the federal government, was
superior in matters of fundamental justice affecting the welfare of the
whole nation." 9
The people retained power to identify and to redress infringements
against their fundamental interests. They did not alienate the ability to
define those interests to any single branch of government, such as the
judiciary. Rather, working through a representative democracy, the people
could exercise their evolving understanding of inalienable rights.
The significance of choosing to promulgate the Constitution pursuant
to the will of the people rather than the states cannot be overstated. During
the Civil War, a historian asserted that secession was unconstitutional since
[t]he Constitution was not drawn up by the States, it was
not promulgated in the name of the States, it was not ratified
by the States. . . .It was ordained and established over the
States by a power superior to the States-by the people of the
whole land in their aggregate capacity, acting through
conventions of delegates expressly chosen for the purpose
"1 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
116 "[General] welfare" is interchangeable with "happiness of a people" and was achievable in a
representative state where the people were "secure" in their "enjoyment of liberty and property." JOHN
CARTWRIGHT, AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, THE INTEREST AND GLORY OF GREAT BRITAIN 35 (1776).
117 JAMES SULLIVAN, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 26 (1791).
118 RESULT OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES HOLDEN AT IPSWICH IN THE COUNTY OF ESSEX,
WHO WERE DEPUTED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CONSTITUTION AND FORM OF
GOVERNMENT, PROPOSED BY THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 17
(Newburyport, John Mycall 1778).
119 See DAVID RAMSAY, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME
FEDERAL COURT, OVER THE SEVERAL STATES, IN THEIR POLITICAL CAPACITY 11-12 (Charelston,
W.P. Young 1792) (analyzing the people's capacity to dissolve a government that deviates from the
Preamble's stated purposes and the boundaries of the Constitution's internal provisions).
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within each State, independently of the State Governments.
120
This perspective was grounded in constitutional tradition. The power to
dissolve the government, as James Iredell explained in 1788 to the North
Carolina ratifying convention, resided in the people alone who could later
choose any other form of government that would "be more conducive to
their welfare.' 121 Because the people had agreed to the Constitution, only
they could alter it.
The gradual process of amending the Constitution began shortly after
its ratification, long before Reconstruction. Even before the conclusion of
the Philadelphia Convention, the Federalist Party's contention that a bill of
rights would be extraneous became suspect. In support of retaining the
original Constitution without amendment, apologists argued that the
inclusion of a bill of rights would be unnecessary. They claimed that the
Preamble implicitly obligated the national government to act in the interest
of justice for the security of domestic tranquility and the emoluments of
liberty.
Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 84, for example, that past
bills of rights had been grants from kings to their subjects. 22 Such grants
were unnecessary in America, where the power of government came from
the people who "surrender nothing" of their inalienable rights and therefore
did not need to explicitly reserve any part of them.123  James Wilson
proudly distinguished the need of British citizens for a declaration of rights
and the implicit retention of rights by American citizens against
governmental interference. The Magna Carta regarded the declared
liberties to be "the gift or grant of the king"; Wilson argued on the other
hand the Constitution was a grant of power to government from the people
who would not part with their natural liberties.124 An individual who had
assented to be governed by a representative "surrenders the power of
controuling... natural alienable rights, only when the good of the whole
requires it.' 25 Thomas Hartley further explained that because the people
delegated power to government through the Constitution, "whatever
portion of those natural rights we did not transfer to the government was
20 James M. Beck, The Preamble of the Constitution, 14 GEO. L.J. 217, 223 (1926) (quoting a
letter written by a historian, Motley, to The London Times during the Civil War) (quotation omitted).
121 James Iredell, Convention of North Carolina (July 22, 1788), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 228, 230 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS].
22 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 259, 262 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
123 id.
124 James Wilson, The Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE
STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 382, 383-84 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY].
125 RESULT OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, supra note 118, at 14.
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still reserved and retained by the people.' 26
Many constitutional theorists stressed the inherent risk of enumerating
inalienable rights retained by the people against arbitrary governmental
intrusion. They believed it would
not only [be] useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number
of rights which are not intended to be given up; because it
would be implying, in the strongest manner, that every right
not included in the exception might be impaired by the
government without usurpation; and it would be impossible
to enumerate every one.
Where there was no enumeration of rights, Wilson argued, the people
retained all rights, but "an imperfect enumeration" of rights threatened to
make the government seem like the grantor of innate interests. 128 During
the North Carolina ratification convention, one participant argued that "if
there be certain rights which never can, nor ought to, be given up, these
rights cannot be said to be given away, merely because we have omitted to
say that we have not given them up.'' 129 The real risk was that any branch
of government would usurp the people's power by refusing to recognize
any inalienable right they had not listed in the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
while the "the law of nature" was thought to be predicated on "immutable.
. . principles," in its "operations and effects" its interpretation was
"progressive" and malleable.' 30  This meant that "in the progress of
things," future generations might "discover some great and Important
[right], which we don't now think of.' 13 1
In a representative polity, the people can petition elected
representatives to fulfill the Preamble's mandate that the federal
government provide for the general welfare. The judiciary has no
constitutional authority to suppress that process. While the judiciary can
best adjudicate disputes between parties with conflicting liberty interests,
groups and individuals who are not involved in justiciable conflicts are
more likely to achieve results by petitioning legislators to recognize and
protect essential rights. The Preamble places obligations on all three
branches of government; hence, it appears before the enumeration of
126 Thomas Hartley, The Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 124, at 429, 430.
127 James Iredell, Convention of North Carolina (July 29, 1788), in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at 164, 167.
121 James Wilson, Convention of Pennsylvania (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at 418, 436.
129 Archibald Maclaine, Convention of North Carolina (July 29, 1788), in 4 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 121, at 160, 161.
130 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 127 (James Dewitt Andrews ed., 1896).
131 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 2 THE LETrERS AND
PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803, at 530, 532-33 (David John Mays ed., 1967).
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Congress's powers in Article 1, the President's authority in Article 2, and
the judiciary's duties in Article 3.
C. A Failure of Principle
The founding generation's decision to adopt constitutional clauses that
protected the institution of slavery was a glaring failure to secure the
universal-sounding principles of the Declaration and the Preamble. Many
of the framers understood that, by retaining slavery, the newly formed
states violated the moral norms at the core of the colonists' assertion of
independence from Great Britain. Patrick Henry even acknowledged his
own hypocrisy after he read an abolitionist tract:
[I]s it not amazing, that at a time when the rights of
Humanity are defined & understood with precision in a
Country above all others fond of Liberty: that in such an Age
and such a Country, we find Men, professing a Religion the
most humane, mild, meek, gentle [and] generous, adopting a
Principle as repugnant to humanity . . . .Would any one
believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase! I am
drawn along by ye general Inconvenience of living without
them; I will not, I cannot justify it .... I believe a time will
come when an opp[o]rtunity will be offered to abolish this
lamentable Evil.'32
Nevertheless, at the nation's founding, the Constitution protected the
institution of slavery. For the sake of compromise, even Gouverneur
Morris, the most outspoken opponent of slavery at the Philadelphia
Convention,133 eventually agreed to the inclusion of the Three-Fifths,
Importation and Fugitive Slave Clauses. 134 Those clauses made egalitarian
statements appear to be no more than empty rhetoric, and they effectively
excluded a large segment of the population from participation in
representative self-governance.
The theory of government commonly asserted in late eighteenth
century America posited that every member of the political body had
132 Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), reprinted in GEORGE S.
BROOKES, FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET 443-44 (1937).
1 See Raymond B. Marcin, "Posterity" in the Preamble and a Positivist Pro-Life Position, 38
AM. J. JURIS. 273, 287 n.46 (1993) (asserting it is commonly accepted that Morris drafted the final
version of the Preamble).
134 Morris's failure to maintain his stance against slavery is explored in Thurgood Marshall,
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) and
Glen E. Thurow, "The Form Most Eligible": Liberty in the Constitutional Convention, 20 PUBLIUS 15,
29 (1990).
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reciprocal rights and duties. 135  A "state of society" had to rely on the
"common wisdom" of its subjects to achieve the "interest and welfare of
[the] community."' 36  The Declaration's philosophical commitment to
equal rights remained unrealized because blacks, women, and property-less
white males were unable to participate in any meaningful type of
policymaking. By countenancing arbitrary state restrictions on political
rights, the nation's collective wisdom remained untapped, reducing its
ability to provide for security, defense, and happiness.
Inequitable cultural norms entered the American Constitution, statutes,
and customs, but not without fairly widespread resistance. From the time
of independence, there were those who believed slavery to be so
antithetical to the nation's founding principles it would whither of its own
accord.
During the struggle with England, slavery was the subject of an ever
increasing number of polemical publications, denouncing its infringement
against the Rights of Man. Benjamin Rush, a physician who signed the
Declaration of Independence, wrote that "it would be useless for us to
denounce the servitude to which the Parliament of Great Britain wishes to
reduce us, while we continue to keep our fellow creatures in slavery just
because their color is different from ours.' 37 England would not accept
the force of revolutionary reasoning, another author wrote in 1774, until
Americans ended the cruelty of slavery. 138 John Allen, who lacked Rush's
political ambitions, denounced slaveholders in more vitriolic terms, calling
them "trifling patriots" and "pretended votaries for Freedom" who
trampled on the natural rights and privileges of Africans while they made a
"vain parade of being advocates of the liberties of mankind., 139 Allen
further pointed out that a duty on tea was of far smaller consequence to
white colonists than the bondage of a captive.140 These abolitionist-minded
statements did not win the day in the immediate aftermath of the
Revolution.
III. ABOLITIONIST IDEALISM
Contrary to the expectations of revolutionaries like Dr. Benjamin
1
35 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 58 (1969)
(noting that the general political attitude in the late eighteenth century was one that emphasized the
need to work together for the common good).
136 SAMUEL WILLIAMS, A DISCOURSE ON THE LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY 9-10 (1774).
137 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823, at
274 (1975) (quoting Benjamin Rush's argument that Americans could not complain about their
previous servitude to England so long as slavery still existed in America).
138 See RICHARD WELLS, A FEW POLITICAL REFLECTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION
OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 80 (1774) (arguing that the people of England would not accept the
Colonies' revolutionary ideology until slavery was abolished).
139 JOHN ALLEN, THE WATCHMAN'S ALARM TO LORD N---H 27 (1774).
'40 Id. at 28.
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Rush, slavery remained a persistent problem in the United States.
Nevertheless, groups inspired by the nation's founding principles
advocated for the federal government to help end slavery. Such
abolitionist rhetoric deeply influenced the nation's "second founding" at
the end of the Civil War, when new constitutional amendments augmented
congressional authority. The Declaration's and Preamble's statements of
governmental purposes were at the core of many abolitionist views about
universal rights.
William Lloyd Garrison, an arduous abolitionist newspaper editor,'
4
'
believed that immediate abolition was implicit in the self-evident truths of
the Declaration of Independence.14 2  He and other abolitionists relied on
the Declaration to develop a national reform agenda. They not only
opposed slavery; many abolitionists were also among the most progressive
feminists, believing that the phrase "all men are created equal" referred
collectively to the "human species," implicitly including both men and
women. 1
43
There was a widespread belief among abolitionists that the Revolution
was waged to secure inalienable rights for all. This founding purpose, they
believed, obligated the national government to protect its citizens' natural
rights. An eloquent abolitionist, Wendell Phillips explained, "I
acknowledge the great principles of the Declaration of Independence, that a
state exists for the liberty and happiness of [all] the people .. .[because]
these are the ends of government."' 44
The Preamble to the Constitution also figured prominently in
abolitionist writings. The General Welfare Clause, as they saw it, required
141 See WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD
GARRISON 43 (1963) (noting that Garrison began his career as both an abolitionist and a newspaper
editor). Radical constitutionalists, such as Alvan Stewart, Salmon P. Chase, Frederick Douglass, and
Charles Sumner, argued that, read correctly, the Fifth Amendment "required immediate abolition."
Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 498
(2004). William Lloyd Garrison, on the other hand, believed that "the Constitution established and
protected the institution of slavery" and should therefore be repudiated. MERRILL, supra, at 206; see
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1448-49 (1862) (Sumner presenting anti-slavery view of the Fifth
Amendment); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 15-16 (1860) (Douglass
relying on several constitutional provisions, including the Fifth Amendment, to argue that slavery was
unconstitutional); JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY 188 (1995) (same subject about
Chase); Louisa M. A. Heiny, Radical Abolitionist Influence on Federalism and the Fourteenth
Amenemdent, 17 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 155, 162 (2007) (discussing Stewart's anti-slavery
view of the Fifth Amendment).
142 See William Lloyd Garrison, An Address Delivered Before the Old Colony Anti-Slavery
Society at South Scituate, Mass. 17 (July 4, 1839) ("[1]f we advocate gradual abolition, we shall
perpetuate what we aim to destroy, and proclaim that the Self-Evident Truths which are set forth in the
Declaration of Independence are Self-Evident Lies!").
143 WENDELL PHILLIPS ET AL., WOMAN'S RIGHTS TRACTS 2-3 (1854).
144 WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE WAR FOR THE UNION (1861), reprinted in AMERICAN PATRIOTISM:
SPEECHES, LETrERS AND OTHER PAPERS WHICH ILLUSTRATE THE FOUNDATION, THE DEVELOPMENT,
THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 562, 577 (Selim H. Peabody ed., 1881).
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Congress to act for the betterment of all Americans. 145 Inaction in the face
of entrenched slavery hurt the common good of society. In a racist society,
neither slaves nor free blacks fully shared in the blessings of liberty.' 46
The national government's protection of slavery-for instance, its
tolerance of slave trading in Washington, D.C.-violated its obligation to
promulgate impartial laws for the general welfare. 147 Abolitionists realized
a disconnect existed between the founders' decision to "separate[] from the
mother country" in response to "the attempt of Great Britain to impose on
them a political slavery" and continued despotism against persons of
African descent.
148
To some abolitionists, like Senator Charles Sumner, the original
Constitution and Bill of Rights contained several clauses obligating
Congress to end slavery in the states and the territories under U.S.
control. 149  Other anti-slavery advocates, on the other hand, believed that
while Congress lacked the power to end slavery in existing states, it could
act in federal territories. 150
Many abolitionists relied on revolutionary ideology about fundamental
rights to help them formulate theories about congressional power. They
adopted a creed which considered fundamental rights intrinsic to national
citizenship. 151 Lucretia Mott, an early abolitionist and feminist, noted that
what struck her about the first American Anti-Slavery Society meeting of
"' See, e.g., G. W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY:
EMBRACING AN ABSTRACT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THIS SUBJECT 62 (1841) (asserting that the United States's compact "is a declaration before the world,
and this nation has committed itself, that this country shall be ruled by impartial laws, and that the
[C]ongress of the United States shall consult in all things the general welfare of the people").
146 An example of this line of reasoning is found in CHARLES OLCOTT, Two LECTURES ON
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 88 (1838). Olcott considered slavery to be against "the whole spirit" of the
Preamble. Id.
147 See John Hope Franklin & Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Race in America: Looking Back, Looking
Forward, 55 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 42, 46-47 (2001) (listing discriminatory laws in effect
even before Washington, D.C., became a city, and discussing pro-slavery theorists' rationale for
justifying slavery). For a discussion on efforts to abolish slavery in Washington, D.C., see Howard H.
Bell, The American Moral Reform Society, 1836-1841, 27 J. NEGRO EDUC. 34, 35 (1958) (noting that
the Moral Reformers hoped to abolish slavery in Washington, D.C., by appointing lecturers,
establishing a press, petitioning congress, and encouraging free labor).
148 MELLEN, supra note 145, at 55, 63.
149 See Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States-
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 182 (1951)
(discussing Sumner's belief that the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment as well as the
common defense and war clauses authorized Congress to pass a statute that would abolish slavery); see
also Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
305, 305 (1988) (noting that commentators frequently discuss the original Constitution's due process,
equal protection, and privileges and immunities clauses in anti-slavery rhetoric).
150 See tenBroek, supra note 149, at 182-83 (1951) (noting that some abolitionists believed the
Constitution authorized Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories but
not in the states).
151 See Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism
Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.R. 1773, 1798 (2006) (noting that the
abolitionists believed that natural rights were intrinsic to citizenship).
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1833 was the declaration of sentiments, based on "the truths of Divine
Revelation, and on the Declaration of Independence, as an Everlasting
Rock."' 52 A female physician, writing in the 1850s, lamented the nation's
failure to live up to its founding document:
Is not the time coming when this body will have to analyze
the Declaration of Independence, and give it its full and
legitimate construction?--"All men are born free and
equal;".-"All governments derive their just power from the
consent of the governed;"--"Taxation without representation
is tyranny." These great axioms uttered by the voice of truth,
will be canvassed in connection with woman, and right, not
might .... Woman's voice will be heard even in this sanctum
sanctorum, not as now in the Senate chamber, petitioning that
slavery may not extend its baleful influence, but pleading for
the "inalienable rights" of all human beings.
53
In the opinion of such activists, citizenship was the birthright of
everyone born in the United States, and safeguarding it was the obligation
of the entire federal government. 154  Their political rhetoric extolled the
American project to protect human rights. Natural rights, their
publications often stated, are intrinsic to everyone and predate society. 55
In language more than likely familiar to the founders, Unitarian abolitionist
William E. Channing asserted that civil societies are organized to protect
those rights. 156 Without legislative power and willingness to pass national
statutes against slavery, the protection of civil rights was left to the
discretion of the very states that sanctioned the institution.
Slavery prevented hundreds of thousands of people from enjoying their
inalienable rights. 157  Theodore Parker, like other abolitionist authors,
152 JAMES AND LUCRETIA MOTT: LIFE AND LETTERS 115 (Anna Davis Hallowell ed., 1884)
(quoting Lucretia Mott's description of her reaction to the first American Anti-Slavery Society meeting
of 1833).
153 HARRIOT K. HUNT, GLANCES AND GLIMPSES; OR FIFTY YEARS SOCIAL, INCLUDING TWENTY
YEARS PROFESSIONAL LIFE 318-19 (1856).
154 See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY:
TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN RELATION TO THAT
SUBJECT 91, 93 (1849) (noting that slaves born in the United States are citizens, and that it is the
responsibility of the federal government to protect the rights of anyone who is a rightful citizen of the
United States).
"' See, e.g., id. at 86-87 (noting that people necessarily existed before government was created,
that the government was therefore designed to protect people's individual rights, and that these
protected rights include the right to personal security, personal liberty, and private property).
156 See WILLIAM E. CHANNING, SLAVERY, reprinted in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM E. CHANNING,
D.D. 688, 699 (American Unitary Association ed., 1900) ("[T]he great end of civil society is to secure
[individual rights].").
"' See Principles of the Anti-Slavery Society, in THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY ALMANAC, FOR
1837, at 30 (1837) ("It is for the rights of MAN that we are contending--he rights of ALL men-our
own rights-the rights of our neighbor--4he liberties of our country-of our posterity--of our fellow
men-of all nations, and of all future generations.").
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located the right to live a free and happy life in the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble. 58  Liberty, as other inalienable rights,
was guaranteed equally for all, irrespective of their race. 59 Incumbent on
the national government was the obligation to abolish slavery through laws
that would provide for the equal enjoyment of "civil and political rights
and privileges."' 60
The abolitionist understanding of national government and
congressional power rested largely on the proposition that the United
States was duty-bound to protect equal rights. The creed of equal liberty
bridged the gap between the Revolutionary Period and the Antebellum
Period. The Declaration was the cornerstone of the "temple of freedom"
for which "[a]t the sound of their trumpet-call, three millions of people
rose up as from the sleep of death, and rushed to the strife of blood;
deeming it more glorious to die instantly as freemen, than desirable to live
an hour as slaves.' 6' According to constitutional attorney Joel Tiffany,
when the Revolutionary generation denied Great Britain the right and
power to violate the colonists' privilege to enjoy their natural rights, that
generation prohibited the newly formed United States government from
countenancing enslavement.162  Radical abolitionists regarded the
"principles embodied" in the Declaration of Independence as "in direct
antagonism" with the Constitution, which represented "no more than the
political compromises of a day."' 163 Only constitutional amendments could
shift the nation's legal priorities.
Prior to the Civil War, abolitionists were in the minority.' 64 However,
the abolitionist branch of Congress became increasingly influential as the
Civil War took a larger toll on the nation's financial and human resources.
Those who sought the abolition of slavery through constitutional
amendment were determined to also augment congressional authority over
civil rights.
158 See Theodore Parker, The Dangers from Slavery (July 2, 1854), in 4 OLD SOUTH LEAFLETS 1-
3 (1897) (noting that natural rights are protected by the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble,
and that no state or federal law supported the notion of slavery).
' See WILLIAM GOODELL, ADDRESS OF THE MACEDON CONVENTION BY WILLIAM GOODELL;
AND LETTERS OF GERRIT SMITH 3 (1847) (arguing that the "rights of all shall be equally and
impartially protected," regardless of race).
160 New-England Anti-Slavery Soc'y, Constitution of the New-England Anti-Slavery Society, in I
THE ABOLITIONIST: OR RECORD OF THE NEW ENGLAND ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 2 (1833).
161 Am. Anti-Slavery Soc'y, Declaration of the Anti-Slavery Convention, Dec. 4, 1833, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA 12 (1833).
162 See TIFFANY, supra note 154, at 29 ("By denying to the government of Great Britain, the
rightful power to violate these privileges in their own persons, they denied to themselves the rightful
power to violate them in the persons of others; and by this solemn act of theirs, they are forever
estopped from setting up such claim.").
163 2 WILLIAM HEPWORTH DIXON, NEW AMERICA 354 (5th ed. 1867).
" Sumner located the constitutional barriers against slavery in the guarantee of republican
government, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Common Defense and War
Clauses. tenBroek, supra note 149, at 182.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
During the late 1860s, many members of the Reconstruction Congress
shared the radical abolitionists' conviction that the Declaration of
Independence and Preamble to the Constitution made the federal
government responsible for protecting fundamental rights. To make this a
reality, the Constitution needed amendments to augment federal statutory
authority enough to identify and to protect the people's fundamental rights.
Several members of Congress during the Civil War had long been involved
in abolitionist causes.' 65 They and others repeatedly spoke of how changes
to the Constitution would allow the legislative branch to pass laws for
protecting individual rights.' 66 The decision to expand legislative authority
into matters that previously had been the states' sole province is
unmistakable from speeches delivered by supporters of the proposed
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Bill of
1866. 167
A. The Thirteenth Amendment
Debates on the Thirteenth Amendment repeatedly referred to the
American Revolution's ideals. The spirit of '76 filled radical Republicans
who ardently supported the Amendment. John P. Hale, a Senator from
New Hampshire, for example, believed that the abolition of slavery was
essential to disengage the United States from the patent inconsistencies that
tainted its history. He called on fellow citizens to "wake up to the meaning
of the sublime truths" and proclaimed that the nation's "fathers uttered
165 Radicals dominated the Senate during debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The Amendment was one of their few opportunities to bring about revolutionary
change to race relations. Sumner was the chairman of the coveted Committee on Foreign Relations
throughout Radical Reconstruction. Senator Benjamin Wade was the Chairman of both the Joint
Committee on the Conduct of the War and the Senate Committee on Territories. Wade also later
became the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. William Fessenden was the Chairman of the Senate
Committee of Finance at the beginning of the Civil War, and he returned to that post after having
served as President Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury. Senator Henry Wilson, a lifelong abolitionist,
was the chairman of the Military Affairs committee from 1863 to 1872. The Chairman of the Senate
Public Land Committee until 1865 was James Harlan, who conceived of Congress's power under the
Thirteenth Amendment to extend to a breadth of freedoms including conjugal rights. See 2
COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, 1789-1946, passim (David T. Canon et al. eds., 2002). For a
listing of congressional radicals and conservatives, see MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 339-77 (1974).
' See Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil
Rights after the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REv. 45, 49 (1987) ("Congressional Republicans legislated to
secure the civil rights of Americans... with the understanding that.., the Thirteenth and then the
Fourteenth Amendment... gave.., all Americans the fundamental rights of citizenship and delegated
to Congress the authority to protect citizens in their enjoyment of these rights.").
167 On the merging of principles from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into § I of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress's Power To Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 263, 274-75, 280-
81 (2005); Pratik A. Shah, Saving Section 5: Lessons from Consent Decrees and Ex Parte Young, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1001, 1060 (2005).
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years ago and which have slumbered dead letters upon the pages of our
Constitution, of our Declaration of Independence, and of our history.'
' 68
Decades of sectional conflicts over the spread of slavery focused
Congress's attention on the "great wrong, in a moral and social point of
view" that "was admitted into the organic law" at the nation's founding
"under a supposed necessity for union."' 169 "Our ancestors' hypocrisy in
fighting to safeguard their own "inalienable right of liberty," asserted
Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri, while denying "it to others" under
the guise of "false counsels of expediency," led to Civil War.170 Preserving
individual rights for the common good of the nation required restructuring
its organic law. Constitutional amendments were essential for changing
national aspirations into enforceable rights.
Establishing a doctrinal foundation for the rebirth of freedom,
proponents of the Thirteenth Amendment interpreted the Declaration of
Independence to refer to everyone, irrespective of their race. The effect of
such amendment made the self-evident truth of the Declaration a practical
application, rendering it beyond doubt that everyone is endowed with
legally cognizable inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. 171 As Representative James S. Rollins of Missouri interpreted
it, American Revolutionaries, from the North and the South, anchored "the
great principle ...in the rights of man, founded in reason," and made
applicable to everyone "without distinction of race or of color" to be
"created equal."' 172 A Democrat from Maryland, Reverdy Johnson, whose
support for the Thirteenth Amendment was crucial to its passage,
considered the Declaration to be "the Magna Charta of human rights."'
173
Based on the well-spring of American rights, Johnson believed slavery to
be "inconsistent with the principles upon which the Government is
founded."'174 Following the abolitionists' lead, Congress of the mid-1860s
conceived slavery as violative of the Preamble's guaranty of tranquility
and general welfare. 1
75
The emphasis on egalitarian principles was a further indication of the
fundamental change in structure of government. The head of the House
Judiciary Committee, James F. Wilson of Iowa, drew his inspiration from
168 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1443 (1864).
"9Id. at 1461.
170 id.
171 See id. at 1424 ("We mean that the Government in future shall be ... one, an example of
human freedom for the light and example of the world, and illustrating in the blessings and the
happiness it confers the truth of the principles incorporated into the Declaration of Independence, that
life and liberty are man's inalienable right.").
172 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 260 (1865).
173 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1420 (1864).
174 Id. at 1422.
175 See, e.g., id. at 1423 ("How pregnant with a conclusive answer is the preamble to the
proposition that slavery cannot be abolished! ... Is there no justice in putting an end to human
slavery?").
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the revolutionary proclamation of "human equality" as the "sublime
creed," demanding all be treated as "equals before the law.' ' 176 The nation
would be rebuilt, with the union forever changed where "equality before
the law is to be the great corner-stone" that the states and the judiciary
would be unable to undermine. 177 Following ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, its opponents argued that it was never meant to make blacks
equals before the law but only to set them free from the fetters of
slavery. 178 This was no less than an attempt to annul the breadth of the
Amendment's principles.
Part of the uncertainty about the Amendment's wide-ranging grant of
congressional authority arose from its cryptic language, allowing for a
stilted literal interpretation. In hindsight, the Senate erred when it refused
to adopt Senator Charles Sumner's proposed modification to the
amendment. He had sought to add a clause explicitly recognizing that "all
persons are equal before the law.' 79 Others thought Sumner's addendum
to be extraneous because equality was already implicit in constitutional
abolition. But the failure to include some mention of equality enabled
congressmen, like Senator Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana, to argue-
even after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment-that blacks were
inferior. "It may be preached; it may be legislated for.., but there is that
difference between the two races that renders it impossible," Hendricks
proclaimed.1 80
The Amendment's supporters, who made up the supermajority of both
chambers of Congress, repeatedly expressed a very different view. Their
speeches often stressed the equality of every person to enjoy inalienable
rights.18' With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, argued one
Congressman, "[t]he old starry banner of our country... will be grander,"
because "universal liberty" and "the rights of mankind" will then be
protected "without regard to color or race. 182 By passing the Thirteenth
Amendment, Senator Lot M. Morrill argued a year after its ratification that
the nation had "wrought" a "change" that "was in harmony with the
'76 Id. at 1319.
177 Id. at 2989.
17s See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866) (statement of Mr. Willard
Saulsbury) (arguing that before the adoption of the amendment, Congress did not have the authority to
make free African-Americans equal to white-Americans before the law). Oddly, it was Saulsbury's
interpretation of the lack of equality principle in the Thirteenth Amendment that became the standard
interpretation despite the fact that he voted against the amendment and was among the first to show his
disdain for it. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1864).
179 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 521 (1864); id. at 1483.
Id. at 1457.
8 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1423 (1864) ("I am not to be told, Mr.
President, that our fathers looked to this race merely because they differed in color from ourselves as
not entitled to the rights which for themselves they declared to be inalienable.").
2 Id. at 2989.
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fundamental principles of the Government.'
8 3
A century later in 1968, the Warren Court made the same point about
the extent of congressional power available under the Thirteenth
Amendment:
[T]his Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they
may have encompassed, the badges and incidents of
slavery-its "burdens and disabilities"--included restraints
upon "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil
freedom, namely, the same right . . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens."' 4
Accordingly, Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the
authority to pass laws rationally related to achieving the legitimate
governmental purpose of rectifying continued incidents of involuntary
servitude.
85
B. Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Thirteenth Amendment not only abolished slavery, its second
section provided Congress with the power to develop a statutory agenda to
protect fundamental rights-especially those connected to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. 8 6 Accordingly, shortly after the states ratified the
Thirteenth Amendment, Congress proceeded with a bill "to protect all
persons in the United States in their civil rights and furnish the means of
their vindication."'187 Enacted less than four months after states ratified the
amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 offers one of the most telling
indicators of the extent to which reconstruction of the Constitution
expanded congressional prerogatives regarding how best to secure essential
freedoms. 18
8
183 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866) (statement of Sen. Morrill).
184 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
22 (1883)).
85 See id. at 440-41 ("Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally
to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation.").
181 ALEXANDER TSESIS, PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ABOLITIONISM AND
ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Alexander Tsesis ed., Columbia Univ. Press, forthcoming 2009)
[hereinafter PROMISES OF LIBERTY].
187 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1866).
"'s Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The Act secured the right to "make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property." The statute further provided citizens with the "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property ... any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." It prohibited public and private acts of discrimination.
Federal courts were authorized to exercise original jurisdiction over cases, but state courts could also
hear causes of action arising under the Act. Litigants could remove cases from state to federal courts, if
state laws infringed on federal rights. Even state officials who violated the Act could be criminally
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Many of the speeches supporting the bill connected it with the
country's fundamental tenets. Minnesota Representative William
Windom, who later served as the Secretary of the Treasury under
Presidents James Garfield and Benjamin Harrison, believed the bill to be
"one of the first efforts made since the formation of the Government to
give practical effect to the principles of the Declaration of
Independence."' 9 As the bill's Senate floor leader Lyman Trumbull put it,
1776's "immortal declaration" of equal and inalienable rights has "very
little importance" as merely a statement of "abstract truths and principles
unless they can be carried into effect" through concrete federal statutes. 19°
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 applied to "the whole people" throughout
the United States, regardless of whether they were "high and low, rich and
poor, white and black."' 9' From its inception, the nation had "professed"
to be governed by "the absolute equality of rights," but the United States
then "denied to a large portion of the people equality of rights .... ,,192 The
newly ratified amendment provided Congress with authority to make
freedom universally applicable to all states.
Even opponents of the bill realized there was a "logic and a legal
connection between" Congress's ability to "exercise power" to pass a law
"in fact and equality" to protect the "civil rights, fundamental rights
belonging to every man as a free man," including those "to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."'' 93
A supermajority was needed to pass the bill into law over President
Andrew Johnson's veto. 194 Many of the speeches supporting its passage
argued that prohibiting discrimination was essential for guaranteeing real
freedom.195 Normative arguments during congressional debates relied on
the country's founding principles to support congressional civil rights
authority; discrimination was asymmetrical with the stable norms of post-
bellum republican governance. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
had granted Congress the dynamic authority to discern and legislate against
prosecuted. All violators could be imprisoned for up to a year and fined no more than $1000. States
retained concurrent authority to pass civil rights laws. Id.
189 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866) (statement of Rep. Windom).
'90 Id. at 474.
191 Id. at 1159 (statement of Rep. Windom).
192id
193 Id. at 476 (statement of Rep. Saulsbury).
194 For Johnson's veto message with its objection to the expansion of federalism at the expense of
state rights, see id. at 1857-60.
'9' See, e.g., id. at 1152 (statement of Rep. Thayer) ("The sole purpose of the bill is to secure to
that class of persons the fundamental rights of citizenship; those rights which constitute the essence of
freedom, and which are common to the citizens of all civilized States; those rights which secure life,
liberty, and property, and which make all men equal before the law, as they are equal in the scales of
eternal justice .... ").
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any abiding or new infringements on fundamental legal freedoms. 196
Reconstruction broke from "the dogma that this is the country of the white
man, and that no other man has rights here which the white man is bound
to respect."'
197
Enforcement of the Constitution's new guarantee of universal freedom
was to be "a return to the principles of the founders of the Government.",
l98
While the purpose of governance continued to be grounded in early
American thought, the Thirteenth Amendment wrought a revolutionary
change in the relationship between state and federal governments. Its
passage was an unambiguous decision that federal authority over civil
rights was necessary given states' unwillingness to abide by the principles
of governance found in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble
to the Constitution. Unsurprisingly, the Reconstruction Congress did not
leave the task of protecting fundamental rights to the judiciary alone, given
that less than ten years before the Thirteenth Amendment the Court had
found the Constitution inapplicable to black persons. 199  Anti-
discrimination policy became a national rather than solely a state or local
matter.
Congress, not the judiciary, was to take the leadership role for
protecting individual rights. From the very beginning of the debate,
Senator Trumbull elaborated on the nature of liberty and equality. He
acknowledged that in a civil society absolute freedom was inconceivable,
but he proclaimed that Congress could secure to all freepersons the rights
to travel, bring law suits, enter into contracts, and to own, inherit, and
dispose of property.200 The new federalism vested Congress with the
power to identify and to protect individual rights for the common good.
Trumbull relied on William Blackstone's Commentaries to stress the
intersection between individual freedom and the common good: "'Civil
liberty is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws and
no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public. '"9201
The bill's opponents argued vehemently that the law would hinder
states from governing internal matters; they believed that its provisions
would usurp state sovereignty over ordinary contract and real estate
'96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.").
197 CONG. GLOBE, 39h Cong., I' Sess. 1262 (statement of Rep. Broomall). For similarly racist
comments, see id. at 530 (statement of Sen. Davis) and id. at 1263 (statement of Rep. Wright). Other
congressmen rejected the bill because they considered it an over-extension of congressional power.
See, e.g., id. at 1267-68 (statement of Rep. Kerr).
'
98 Id at 1262 (statement of Rep. Broomall).
199 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04,407-08 (1856).
200 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866).
201 Id. at 474 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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transactions, over which states had formerly exercised sole discretion.2 °2
Responding to these concerns, Senator Trumbull asserted that the new
law was not meant to destroy federalism, but rather to secure equal rights
for each American.20 3 Among these essential interests, he asserted, are
"the right to life, to liberty, and to avail one's self of all the laws passed for
the benefit of the citizen to enable him to enforce his rights .... ,204 The
newly reconstructed form of federalism emphasized Congress's role in
facilitating individuals' dignitary interests. It left intact state powers
insofar as they dealt with ordinary legal matters, from labor and
transactional agreements to tort and criminal law.
205
States no longer had sovereign discretion to implement racially
discriminatory laws. The Thirteenth Amendment, explained Senator Lot
M. Morrill, a former governor of Maine, was predicated on "the high
principles of American law .. .. The civil rights bill was meant to
place blacks on "the plane of manhood," bringing them "within the pale of
the Constitution., 207 Its aim was not merely to be legislative, but also to be
declarative "of a grand, fundamental principle of law and politics ....,208
The law thereby remained true to the Thirteenth Amendment's
interconnection between enforceable constitutional law, the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution.
The Thirteenth Amendment granted the federal government far more
power to protect fundamental rights than it enjoyed prior to the Civil War.
The states' variegated policies on interpersonal behavior could not impede
congressional civil rights efforts. 20 9 The Civil Rights Act was born of a
determination to establish law that would "carry to its legitimate and just
result the great humane revolution .... ,210
To the great surprise of the Reconstruction Congress, Andrew Johnson
vetoed it. 211  During the debates following that unexpected outcome,
Trumbull, whose Senate Judiciary Committee had fashioned the language
of the Thirteenth Amendment, became even clearer about why Congress
202 Id. at 476-78 (statements of Rep. Saulsbury) (discussing the invasion of states' rights in
general and to govern real estate transactions); id. at 595-96 (statements of Rep. Davis) (discussing
states' rights to regulate property).
203 Id. at 599.
o4 Id. at 600.
201 Id. at 599-600.
206 Id. at 570.
207 Id. at 569-70.
208 id.
209 For a debate about the effects of state laws legalizing slavery on the citizenship status of blacks
in the United States, see the withering exchange between radical Republican Senator Daniel Clark and
Unionist Garrett Davis. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 528-29 (1866). Clark's ire was peaked
by Davis's misstatement, reminiscent of Chief Justice Taney's in Dred Scott, that prior to the
Revolution blacks had not been citizens in any colony. Id. at 523-24, 527.
210 Id. at 1151 (Statement of Rep. Thayer from Pa.).
21
1 ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 56 (2004).
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had the authority to pass a national law prohibiting discrimination in
property, contract, and court related matters. 1 2 The civil rights bill was
meant to safeguard "inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free
citizens or free men . . . and they belong to them in all the States of the
Union. ''213 Every citizen, whether born in the U.S. or naturalized, had the
right to "go into any State of the Union and to reside there., 214 To further
signal the great change in federalism initiated by the Thirteenth
Amendment, Trumbull relied not on judicial precedents but on classic legal
treatises. The Amendment would overturn any precedent violative of
fundamental rights and it afforded Congress's power to safeguard it.
Trumbull again relied on Blackstone for the proposition that citizens
are entitled to "natural liberty" and, therefore, the law can only restrain
them insofar as it "'is necessary and expedient to the general advantage of
the public.' 215 Civil liberties "'should be equal to all, or as much so as the
nature of things will admit.' ' 216 These quotes from Blackstone in the
context of debates about the civil rights bill reflected a national perspective
on individual rights and general welfare. Trumbull also quoted James
Kent, who, like Blackstone, wrote a leading legal treatise. Kent premised
that among the interests included in "'equal[] . . . rights . . . of a
commonwealth"' are "'the right of personal security, the right of personal
liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.' 21 7 In Kent, Trumbull
found further support for the proposition that inalienable rights are not
limited to citizens but extend to all the inhabitants of the United States.21 8
A review of the congressional debates indicates that the civil rights bill
was meant to achieve the normative purposes of American government.
Congress used its Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 enforcement authority
to identify and protect rights that it perceived to be essential to the
privileges of citizenship.
Senator Trumbull further relied on Justice Bushrod Washington's
circuit court dictum, in Corfield v. Coryell,219 to deduce the extent of
congressional authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.22 ° Washington's
nonexhaustive list of privileges of citizenship included,
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
212 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FROM
CONFEDERATION TO NATION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1835-1877, at 191 (1973).
213 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).
214 id.
2 15 
Id.216 1d.
217 id.
2 18 id.
219 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
220 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., I st Sess. 474-75 (1866).
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happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints
as the government may justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise ....22
The Reconstruction Congress interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as a
grant of authority to identify and secure these and other essential liberties,
whether or not the Bill of Rights enumerated them.222
Key supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 expected Congress to
begin with Corfield in its Thirteenth Amendment obligation to identify
inalienable civil rights.223 But just like the Bill of Rights, the dictum in
Corfield was not meant to be the final word on the nature of fundamental
rights. The Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to identify
violations against core American interests and to pass any laws necessary
to put an end to them.
As for the judiciary, Section 3 of the Civil Rights Bill gave district
courts exclusive jurisdiction over criminal and civil offenses arising under
the Act.224 But it was Congress, not the judiciary, who was to be primarily
responsible for identifying which rights were fundamental enough to
warrant federal protections.225
Summing up the significance of the new law, Trumbull concluded: "If
the bill now before us, and which goes no further than to secure civil rights
to the freedman, cannot be passed, then the constitutional amendment
proclaiming freedom to all the inhabitants of the land is a cheat and a
delusion., 226 Just a few months earlier, Congressman James Garfield, who
would eventually become President of the United States, declared in
similar terms that if "freedom" meant no more than the abolition of
22' Idat 551-52.
222 See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
BILL OF RIGHTS 80-83 (1986) (discussing the constitutional authority Congress relied on to pass the
Civil Rights Act of 1866); Michael K. Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
Revising the Slaughter-House Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1, 32 n.122 (1996) (citing primary sources on congressional authority to
pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
223 See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 249 (2001); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION 64 (1987); Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 53, 70 n.84 (2003).
224 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 § 3 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1999)); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (1866).
225 In a 1968 decision, the Supreme Court asserted: "Surely Congress has the power under the
Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S.
409,440 (1968).226 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1761 (1866).
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slavery, then it was "a bitter mockery" and "a cruel delusion., 227  The
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicate that, less than half a
year after the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification, the dominant political
view regarded Section 2 of the Amendment as a grant of congressional
power to identify what rights to protect, to establish a rational policy for
combating discrimination, and to promulgate legitimate laws to achieve
that end.228
Opponents of the bill repeatedly attacked the extent to which the
amendment would augment congressional power. Their most cogent
voice, Senator Reverdy Johnson, claimed that a bill that would protect civil
rights throughout the United States violated the Tenth Amendment's
guarantee that "everything not granted was to be considered as remaining
with the States unless the Constitution contained some particular
prohibition of any power before belonging to the States., 229  Johnson
denied that the Thirteenth Amendment enabled Congress to act against
perceived violations of fundamental rights.23 °
Reverdy Johnson's view was shared by a relatively small minority, and
a super-majority soon overrode President Andrew Johnson's veto-the
first veto override regarding a major law in United State history.231 Most
congressmen believed that the Amendment had dramatically altered the
federal-state relationship. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 went so far as to
provide criminal penalties for the abridgment of core American rights, a
step that indicated Congress, immediately after ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, conceived itself no longer to be hamstrung by the
federalism of a bygone era when the racist administration of criminal law
was a state prerogative. The new federalism placed Congress in the
forefront both for identifying the meaning of the Constitution and for
passing laws to protect fundamental rights.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
Many of the congressmen who voted against the Civil Rights Act of
1866 were Democrats claiming it posed a threat to state sovereignty. The
most prominent Republican to vote against it was Representative John A.
Bingham.232 Before the final vote, he explained that he was unwilling to
227 Congressman James A. Garfield, Oration Delivered At Ravenna, Ohio July 4, 1865, in THE
WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 86 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882).
228 Jones, 392 U.S. 440-41 ("Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate
that determination into effective legislation.").
229 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1777 (1866).
230 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1778 (1866).
231 See Aviam Soifer, Protecting Full and Equal Rights: The Floor and More, in PROMISES OF
LIBERTY", supra note 186.
232 For the final House vote on the bill, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1367 (1866).
When the House overrode President Johnson's veto, Bingham abstained from voting on the bill. Id at
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support a statute granting Congress the authority to affect rights the
Supreme Court had left at the sole discretion of the states in Barron v.
Baltimore.233 In his mind, only an additional constitutional amendment
could extend congressional power over civil rights and citizenship.234 To
this end, even before the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Bingham had
begun advocating for the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.235
In May 1866, Congress formally started its debate on the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which was partly meant to constitutionalize
the federal authority over liberty rights codified in the Civil Rights Act of
1866.236 The general presumption was that the pre- and post-veto debates
about the statute had adequately articulated Congress's role in protecting
civil rights, requiring little further elaboration. Accordingly, when Senator
Jacob M. Howard proposed the Citizenship Clause in the future Fourteenth
Amendment, he decided to avoid saying anything "on that subject except
that the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body
[during the civil rights bill debates] as not to need any further elucidation.
,,237
Members of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, such as
Howard, John A. Bingham, and William P. Fessenden, wanted to extend
national power over civil rights beyond the protections enumerated by the
1866 statute.238 In Howard's words, the Committee "desired to put this
question of citizenship and the right of citizens and freedmen under the
civil rights bill beyond the legislative power of such gentlemen as the
1679 (Johnson's veto message); id. at 1861 (House vote to override veto); id at 1809 (Senate vote to
override veto).
233 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866); Barron v. Mayor Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Fifth Amendment solely applies to federal, rather than state
private property takings). Despite Bingham's misgivings, the Supreme Court has never found the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to be unconstitutional. To the contrary, the Court has relied on it to find private
housing discrimination, Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968), and private school
segregation to be punishable. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976).
234 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
235 Interestingly, Bingham made his first mention of the Fourteenth Amendment on January 9,
1866, id. at 158, three days before Trumbull introduced the civil rights bill, id. at 211.
236 See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1584-85 (1995) (stating that the
questionable authority to pass the Civil Rights Act prompted the Joint Committee to solidify it in an
amendment). For a couple of examples of statements connecting the Fourteenth Amendment with the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (statement by Rep.
Eliot) and id. at 2462 (statement of Rep. Garfield).
237 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866). To the extent that the debates on the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment concentrated on defining citizenship, many of the statements
reflected period prejudices against anyone of Chinese, Gypsy, African, and Indian ancestry. See, e.g.,
id at 2890-91, 2939. The primary focus of the Fourteenth Amendment debates was on representation
and voting rights, in the second section, and the disenfranchisement of Confederate-participants, in the
third section. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St.
L.J. 1085, 1088 (1989); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 82 n.151 (1993).
238 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2896 (1866).
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Senator from Wisconsin [James R. Doolittle], who would pull the whole
system up by the roots and destroy it... ,,239 The Committee's aim was to
clarify the grant of congressional enforcement authority in the Thirteenth
Amendment by adding what would become the Equal Protection, Due
Process, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses to the Constitution.
The Committee incorporated phrases with unmistakable abolitionist
overtones into its drafts. Like the Declaration of Independence, the
Fourteenth Amendment directed the nation to examine its practices against
an ideal government that protected individual rights and worked for the
general welfare. Inclusion of the Citizenship Clause seemed to foreclose
any future judicial decision that tied citizenship rights to any particular
race, as Dred Scott had done.240 The terms of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment were broad enough to provide for contemporary and future
federal protections for fundamental rights. Through Supreme Court
interpretation and statutory enactment, for example, twentieth and twenty-
first century judges interpreted the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses to cover the rights of women,241 racial minorities, 242 and disabled
persons.243
In 1866, when the Fourteenth Amendment passed from Congress to the
states for final ratification, its opponents often invoked the pre-Civil War
framework of state exclusivity in civil matters. During debates on the
Fourteenth Amendment, a New Jersey congressman, Representative
Andrew J. Rogers, attacked Section 1 as an "attempt to consolidate the
power of the States and to take away from them the elementary principles
which lie at their foundation." 244  Rogers denounced Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment for granting Congress authority over the privileges
and immunities of U.S. citizens. He worried that congressional authority
to enforce the Amendment would extend to all unenumerated liberties,
such as the rights to marry, serve on a jury, and run for the office of
239 id.
240 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (holding that blacks cannot be
citizens of the United States: "[Negroes were] beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect ... ."). See Alexander Tsesis, Undermining
Inalienable Rights: From Dred Scott to the Rehnquist Court, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1199-1200 (2007)
(discussing the proslavery sentiments endorsed by the Dred Scott decision).
241 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (prohibiting, with
some exceptions, that no one "on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance"); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
242 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e-2) (2000) (prohibiting
employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies from engaging in race, sex, color, religion,
or national origin discrimination); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
243 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000); Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 523 (2004).
244 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2538 (1866).
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President of the United States. 245 Rogers cautioned that the Amendment
246threatened to diminish state powers.
The aims of the proposed amendment were in fact revolutionary.
Section 5 would overhaul federalism by more clearly granting Congress
the authority to safeguard core American interests against any state
encroachment. The Fourteenth Amendment, as centrist Ohio
Representative William Lawrence saw it, forbade the states from passing
or enforcing any laws that arbitrarily "invade[] . . . fundamental
equality."
247
The aspirations of radical congressmen were at least as far-reaching as
Lawrence's. Radical Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois was
among those who hoped "that Congress and the people of the several
States may yet rise above a mean prejudice and do equal and exact justice
to all men, by putting in practice that 'self-evident truth' of the Declaration
of Independence.,248 Those "self-evident" truths had proven inadequate to
prevent the spread of slavery during the antebellum years. The Fourteenth
Amendment now was meant to provide federal legislators with the
constitutional grant of authority to protect citizens' life, liberty, and ability
to pursue happiness and to create uniform civil rights standards.
The possibility that the Supreme Court might overturn legislation
passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment never even
arose during the floor debate. This may be in part because prior to 1866
the Justices had only twice found federal laws unconstitutional; one of
those cases being the infamous Dred Scott decision which the
Reconstruction Amendments overturned.2 49  And it seemed almost
inconceivable that the Court would meddle with explicit congressional
enforcement power.
Supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment had no doubt "as to the
power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all
republican government if they be denied or violated by the States.
250
Senator Luke P. Poland of Vermont believed that the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution had inspired the first clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.251 An Illinois Congressman also linked the new
constitutional safeguard to the Declaration, asking rhetorically how anyone
can "have and enjoy equal rights of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of
245 Id.
246 id.
247 Id. at 1836 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
248 Id. at 2539 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
249 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151). The two cases
were Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 452 (1856). In 1866, Exparte Garland held unconstitutional an ex post facto law meant to
disbar many southern attorneys. Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 381 (1866).
250 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (statement of Sen. Poland).
251 Id.
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happiness' without 'equal protection of law?' 252
Even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, legal
disabilities for blacks persisted.253 Women's rights, moreover, were not
even on Congress's agenda.254 Those "great principles on which our
government is based," which in 1883 the renowned woman's suffragist
Lucy Stone located in the Declaration and the Bill of Rights, "vainly" call
"for equal rights," but were "not respected in their application to
women.' 2ss Furthermore, to many people the Fourteenth Amendment was
an imperfect achievement to combat centuries of despotism in the name of
a free republic.25 6 During the congressional debates, Thaddeus Stevens
stated his dissatisfaction with a partial solution that did not contain any
protection for suffrage:
In my youth, in my manhood, in my old age, I had fondly
dreamed that when any fortunate chance should have broken
up for awhile the foundation of our institutions, and released
us from obligations.., that the intelligent.., and just men of
this Republic, true to their professions and their consciences,
would have so remodeled all our institutions as to have freed
them from every vestige of human oppression, of inequality
of rights, of the recognized degradation of the poor, and the
superior caste of the rich. In short, that no distinction would
252 I d. at 2539 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
253 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-89, 495 (1954) (recognizing the legal
inequalities blacks still suffered, specifically with regards to public education, almost ninety years after
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).
254 Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton unsuccessfully petitioned Congress to add a
provision to the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing women's suffrage rights. CARRIE CHAPMAN
CATT & NETrIE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS: THE INNER STORY OF THE
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 92-106 (1926). Feminist aspirations were also offended because Section 2 of
the Fourteenth, for the first time, introduced the word "male" into the Constitution. It provided that a
state's congressional representation would be diminished proportionately to the number of males older
than twenty-one who were arbitrarily excluded from voting. The provision meant to prevent local
prejudices from denying black males' voting rights, but its use of "male" retained the longstanding
federal policy of non-interference with state disenfranchisement of women. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE, 1861-1876, at 91-92 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1881). Knowing how difficult it
was to change the Constitution, Stanton warned her cousin and ally, Gerrit Smith, that the second
section could "take us a century at least to get it out." Letter from Stanton to Smith (Jan. 1, 1866), in
ELLEN CAROL DuBoIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 61 (1978). An unsuccessful petition drive gathered about ten
thousand signatures to keep "male" out of the constitution. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, EIGHTY
YEARS AND MORE 243 (1898). Stanton demanded that the clause be excised because enfranchising
only black men meant that women were "left outside with lunatics, idiots and criminals." WILLIAM L.
O'NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINISIM IN AMERICA 17 (1969).
25 LEWIS FORD, A Woman Suffrage Catechism in Part, THE VARIETY BOOK 155, 155 (1892).
256 Stevens would have been satisfied with the Joint Committee of Fifteen's initial proposal which
provided that "Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to
all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866). That proposed section would have explicitly provided
Congress with the power to enact laws for ending unequal treatment.
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be tolerated in this purified Republic but what arose from
merit and conduct. This bright dream has vanished .... I
find that we shall be obliged to be content with patching up
the worst portions of the ancient edifice, and leaving it, in
many of its parts, to be swept through by the tempests, the
frosts, and the storms of despotism.
257
To make up for the Congressmen's inability to achieve complete liberal
democracy immediately, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment granted
Congress enforcement authority for future legal progress.2 18 All that was
needed to match national ideals was the legislative initiative to press for
statutory reform. However, in short order the Supreme Court would so
restrain congressional power as to render the Amendment virtually
unrecognizable to participants of the 1866 debate.
V. SUPREME COURT IMPACT ON CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
Immediately after ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments,
Supreme Court Justices deferred to newly enacted civil rights statutes.
Shortly thereafter, however, the nation turned away from revolutionary
reconstruction and toward national reconciliation. In keeping with this
trend, the Court soon checked federal legislative power by nullifying laws
meant to protect fundamental liberties and by closing off federal court
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases arising from racial discrimination. Even
today, the Court continues to rely on precedents whose conceptualization
of federalism is incompatible with the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments' constitutional incorporation of national civil rights norms.
A. Decisions in the Aftermath of the Civil War
The first federal judicial interpretations of Reconstruction laws
recognized that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments had eliminated
the state-oriented civil rights federalism of Dred Scott. This early trend
first appeared when designated circuit court Justice Noah Swayne upheld
Congress's authority to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in United States
v. Rhodes.259 Swayne found that the Thirteenth Amendment enabled
Congress to pass civil rights legislation and to grant federal courts
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases arising under it.260 Congress's new power
was necessary to achieve the "intentions of the framers of the constitution,
and to accomplish the objects for which governments are instituted. 26'
257 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866).
258 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
259 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 794 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).26 0 Id. at 787.
261 Id. at 792.
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Until the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, rights varied "in different
localities and according to the circumstances. 262  After its ratification,
wrote Justice Swayne, the Amendment "trenche[d] directly upon the power
of the states and of the people of the states.
263
Other decisions, such as In re Turner, which struck down Maryland's
apprenticeship statute, also rejected the antebellum state right to
discriminate against blacks.26  In its place, Chief Justice Chase, also
writing as a designated circuit court justice, accepted Congress's power to
set a national civil rights policy. 265 Chase found that after the ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment, "[c]olored persons equally with white
persons are citizens of the United States. 266  The Amendment made
legislators primarily responsible for carrying out its principles: "Congress
is itself the judge of its power to pass such a law, and is alone the judge of
the existing necessity for it.'
267
Four years later, in United States v. Given, with Justice Strong also
sitting as a circuit justice, the Delaware District Court held that the
Reconstruction Amendments "enlarged the powers of [C]ongress" by
securing "to persons certain rights which they had not previously
possessed. 268  He noted that "prior to the recent amendments"
congressional legislation could not be used to protect all personal rights in
the Constitution, "[b]ut the recent amendments have introduced great
changes., 269 Reconstruction had not only extended the notion of rights to a
universal principle often discussed during the Revolutionary Period,270 it
also increased federal legislative power to protect them.
Not only were the rights given-the right of liberty, the
right of citizenship, and the right to participate with others in
voting, on equal terms, without any discrimination on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude-
but power was expressly conferred upon congress to enforce
the articles conferring the right."
' 271
As radical Reconstruction came to an end by the 1 870s, the Supreme
Court began diminishing the scope of congressional civil rights authority.
The Court itself took an increasingly activist role. In this capacity, it
decreased Congress's ability to protect fundamental national interests.
262 Id. at 790.
263 Id. at 788.
264 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
265 Id.
266 Id. at 340.
265 Id. at 339.
268 United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324, 1325 (C.C.D. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210).
1691d. at 1326.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 35-48.
271 Given, 25 F. Cas. at 1326.
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B. Period of Retrenchment
The dramatic judicial shift away from the expectations of the
Reconstruction Congress began with the Slaughter-House Cases of 1872.
Butchers challenged a Louisiana law giving a company an exclusive
license to operate a slaughter yard in the New Orleans area.272 Other than
members of the corporation, all other butchers had to pay a fee to use the
facility.
273
Slaughter-House is infamous for its narrow interpretation of the scope
of American citizens' privileges and immunities. In fact, the only national
privileges the majority acknowledged had already been enumerated by the
original Constitution or identified by Supreme Court precedent. They
included the right to travel to Washington, D.C., the right to protection on
the high seas, and habeas corpus protections.274 The Court implied that
Congress had no authority to redress unenumerated rights. Such an
interpretation, which severely limited legislative power to safeguard the
principles of American governance, ran against the federalist expectations
of the Reconstruction Congress as indicated throughout the debates on the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of
1866.275 Slaughter-House interpreted Justice Washington's dictum in
Corfield about the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause to
correspond to "rights belonging to the individual as a citizen of a State. 276
The Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Samuel F. Miller portentously
wrote for the majority in Slaughter-House, never meant "to transfer the
security and protection of all the civil rights" from state to federal
governments.277 That conclusion undermined the very purposes of the
Reconstruction Amendments: to substantiate the American Creed by
making the federal government primarily responsible for safeguarding
individual freedoms essential to the people's general welfare. And
Slaughter-House set a precedent that the Supreme Court continues to
follow in preventing Congress from enacting civil liberty laws, such as
those prohibiting carrying guns close to schools, violence against women,
or dumping of nuclear waste. I will analyze this contemporary aspect in
272 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 57, 59 (1872).
2731 d. at 59-61.
274 Id. at 79.
275 See supra Part IV (discussing the debates and speeches made in favor of the proposed
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Bill of 1866).
276 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76 (emphasis added). Miller actually misquoted
Corfield. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (1823). Rather than "citizens of the several states,"
which was Miller's formulation, the original case has "citizens in the several states." Id at 550. The
original is more open to a national perspective of privileges and immunities. Kevin Christopher
Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109
YALE L.J. 643, 654 (2000).
277 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77.
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the final section of this Article.278
Although at first glance, Slaughter-House appeared to prevent only the
judiciary from dismantling state monopolies, the case also radically
underplayed the federal government's ability to identify privileges or
immunities other than those explicitly named in the antebellum
Constitution. The growing prevalence in the 1870s and 1880s of state-
sponsored and vigilante racial violence, segregation, and employment and
property discriminations made blacks the decision's greatest losers. In
large part, Congress had lost its power to secure civil rights intrinsic to
United States citizenship. This came at a time when Southern states were
increasingly being "redeemed" from federal control.279
Four out of nine Justices dissented from Miller's opinion.280 Two
separate dissents are directly relevant here. Justice Swayne argued against
rolling back jurisprudence to antebellum state federalism, viewing the
Reconstruction Amendments as "a new departure" because they reduced
state power in favor of a federal duty to protect the rights of the people.28 1
Justice Bradley focused on the Reconstruction Amendments' effect on the
relationship of individuals to their communities. The Fourteenth
Amendment, Bradley argued, had made United States citizenship
"primary," enabling the federal government to step in if a state or local
282power "denied full equality before the law" to any classes of persons.
Bradley implied that the Fourteenth Amendment's nationalization of
citizenship augmented federal jurisdiction to redress unfair legal treatment.
In an 1876 case, the Court continued to diminish the people's ability to
gain legal redress from the federal system. United States v. Cruikshank
nullified a federal law prohibiting racially motivated violence, making its
prevention the sole provenance of the state.283 The opinion left people's
physical safety dependent on differing states' norms rather than on a
congressionally created, unified standard against hate crimes. Just as
Slaughter-House had done in the civil realm, Cruikshank placed states'
traditional sovereignty rights ahead of the newly ratified constitutional
directive for maintaining the American's welfare.
The extent to which the Court in Cruikshank meddled with a legitimate
congressional effort deserves some further elaboration because the
27 See infra Part V.C.
279 See, e.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY
(2002); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 187 AND THE END OF
RECONSTRUCTION (1951).
280 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 125, 128-29 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
282 Id. at 112-16 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
283 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553-54 (1875); Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get
There from Here?: How the Law Still Threatens King's Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 12-13 (2004);
Bezalel Stem, Huck Finn and the Civil Rights Cases: A Case Study in Supreme Court Influence, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 79, 87 (2006).
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Supreme Court relied on the precedent as recently as 2000, in a case that
struck down a civil remedy provision of the VAWA.284
Cruikshank was decided at a time when President Ulysses S. Grant's
Justice Department began scaling back its successful civil rights
enforcement.285 That effort had helped to bring the Ku Klux Klan's reign
of terror to an end, but stopped prematurely partly because of fiscal
concerns and partly because the Court closed meaningful avenues for
federal redress.286 Cruikshank concerned 1873 acts of terrorism, known as
the Colfax Massacre, perpetrated against blacks in Louisiana holding a
political rally at a courthouse.287 By the time the mob violence ended at
least seventy black men and two white men had died.288
Federal prosecutors relied on the First Enforcement Act in obtaining
almost one hundred indictments. They were far less successful at trial,
however, securing only three convictions.289  Defendants eventually
appealed these convictions to the Supreme Court, where the majority
refused to reach the merits of the case. Chief Justice Waite relied on a
procedural device to dismiss all charges against the defendants, finding the
complaints to be deficient.29° While the Court recognized the existence of
a national right to peaceful assembly,291 it refused to extend the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment to privately perpetrated racial violence.292
284 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000); see infra Part VI.
285 On Grant administration prosecutions of the Ku Klux Klan, see ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 457 (1988); Lou FAULKNER
WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA Ku KLUX KLAN TIALS, 1871-1872, at 123 (1996)
(explaining the reason for the decline in Enforcement Act prosecutions by the Justice Department in the
1870s); Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the Enforcement Acts: The Department of Justice in Northern
Mississippi, 1870-1890, 53 J. S. HIST. 421, 425 (1987) (describing the reduction in the number of U.S.
Army soldiers aiding Justice Department officials in the 1870s); Michael E. Deutsch, The Improper
Use of the Federal Grand Jury: An Instrument for the Internment of Political Activists, 75 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1159, 1170 n.56 (1984) (noting federal enforcement actions against the Ku Klux Klan
under the Federal Election Act); Herbert Shapiro, The Ku Klux Klan During Reconstruction: The South
Carolina Episode, 49 J. NEGRO HIST. 34, 45-46 (1964) (describing the Grant Administration's role in
assisting weak state governments in suppressing the Ku Klux Klan); Everette Swinney, Enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-1877, 28 J. S. HiST. 202, 217-18 (1962) (listing the number of
Enforcement Act cases by state from 1870 to 1877).
286 See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at xiii (1985).28
7 HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 488-89 (1982).
288 FONER, supra note 285, at 530-31; KACZOROWSKI, supra note 286, at 176; LEEANNA KEITH,
THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, WHITE TERROR AND THE DEATH OF
RECONSTRUCTION 109 (2008); Swinney, supra note 285, at 207.
289 KACZOROWSKI, supra note 286, at 176-77.
290 Waite found the indictments incomplete because they merely said that the defendants violated
the victims' civil rights rather than enumerating rights enforceable by the federal government. United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-53 (1875).
29' Id. at 552-53.
292 Id. at 554 ("The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, and from denying to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws; but it adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It
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Though seemingly a procedural decision, Cruikshank thwarted
enforcement of a federal hate crimes law that had been drafted to exert the
nation's post-Civil War determination to make the federal government
responsible for protecting the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. These values had been dormant in the nation's founding
documents, and the Reconstruction Amendments made them enforceable.
Yet the Court found a legal technicality to prevent federal enforcement of a
popularly enacted anti-terror law. "Sovereignty," Chief Justice Waite
stated in the opinion, for the protection of the rights of life and personal
liberty within the respective States, "rests alone with the States., 293 This
meant that private discriminatory crimes could only be prosecuted in
states, irrespective of whether any of them lacked adequate remedies
against racist violence. State sovereignty doctrine served as an end around
federal authority to prevent racially motivated violence.
The likelihood that state courts---especially those in the former
Confederate states-would aggressively prosecute lynch mobs was
minuscule at best because of the widespread use of witness intimidation,
accepted racism, and wide-scale efforts to undermine radical
Reconstruction policies.294  Despite the Waite Court's egregious
undermining of congressional Reconstruction, 125 years later, Chief
Justice Rehnquist relied on Cruikshank to overturn a civil remedy of a
popular civil rights statute, the VAWA.295
The Rehnquist Court also relied on the 1883 Civil Rights Cases for
precedent in overturning federal civil liberties laws.296 That nineteenth
century decision ruled on five consolidated causes of action arising under
the Civil Rights Act of 1875,297 the Reconstruction Congress's final
statute.298 The law provided criminal and civil remedies against racial
segregation in public places of accommodation, such as inns, land and
water carriers, and theaters.299
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 showed Congress's willingness to
effectuate America's heritage of universal fundamental rights. Relying on
the post-Civil War shift in constitutional doctrine, the Act provided
Congress with the power to end public segregation, the societal norm
simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental
rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society.").
293 Id. at 553.
294 See Swinney, supra note 285, at 209-11 (arguing that racism and witness intimidation made it
"extremely difficult to gather evidence").295 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-22 (2000); see infra text accompanying notes
339-45.
296 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-27.
297 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883).
298 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating
the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 22 (1995) (discussing debate about
Reconstruction that arose in passing Civil Rights Act of 1875).
299 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-4, 18 Stat. 335, 335-37 (1875).
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which threatened to undermine the moral achievements of Union victory.
Had the Court ruled in favor of a national right to enjoy public spaces, it
could have provided relief for litigants and signaled a willingness to defer
to the popular will-as it expressed itself through congressional
enactment-to end centuries of racial separation. In the 1880s, however, it
was apparent that many in the South sought to maintain slavery by other
names. Sharecropping, segregation, peonage, and the convict lease system
disproportionately harmed blacks, relegating them to second-class
citizenship.)°°
The Civil Rights Cases rejected broad use of congressional power,
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens only against state
infringements and stating that "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject matter of the amendment., 30 1 Victims of exclusionism
could no longer invoke the private remedy provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, even if states had no comparable remedy or had condoned
private discrimination. The Court would not recognize the federal
legislature's claim of authority to pass "general legislation upon the rights
of the citizen," recognizing the constitutionality only of "corrective
legislation[;] that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting
such laws as the States may adopt or enforce. 30 2  This rationale
significantly reduced Congress's power to act against private acts of
discrimination. It left the essential, citizen interests of dignity and
personhood at the sole discretion of the states. Here was a legislative effort
to end segregation in 1875, but the Court refused to allow Congress to rely
on constitutionally delegated powers to achieve that end.
The Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant
Congress authority to target and prevent social discriminations, including
racial exclusion from public places of amusement and racial segregation on
public carriers. It found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional
300 One author found that in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, as many as one-third of all
sharecropping farmers "were being held against their will in 1900." JACQUELINE JONES, THE
DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA'S UNDERCLASSES FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT 107 (1992). On the
convict lease system, see DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR 11 (2008), and
DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW
JUSTICE (1996). See also ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996); KARIN A. SHAPIRO, A NEW SOUTH
REBELLION: THE BATTLE AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN THE TENNESSEE COALFIELDS, 1871-1896
(1998).
301 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is State action of a particular character that is
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a
deeper and broader scope."); see also id. at 19 ("This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and
direct; it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns,
public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legislation on the
same subject, or only allows it permissive force.").
°2Id. at 13-14.
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because the law penalized behavior unconnected to adverse state action.3 °3
The Court refused to defer to Congress's finding that the enjoyment of
equal public accommodations was essential to the full enjoyment of human
dignity. Justice Bradley, who wrote for the majority, also rejected the
claim that Congress could determine that racial segregation in public
places was a badge or incident of involuntary servitude.30 5
Justice John Marshall Harlan stood alone in dissent. He argued that by
prohibiting Congress from passing laws at "its own discretion, and
independently of the action or non-action of the States," the Court
undermined a primary purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments.30 6 He
agreed with the majority that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
enabled Congress to enact statutes to operate directly "upon States, their
officers and agents," but vigorously rejected the state action
requirement.30 7 Such a notion, to Harlan, was a Court created criterion
rather than a substantive part of the Constitution. To the contrary, he
argued, Congress could also prohibit the perpetration of racial
discrimination by "individuals and corporations" who "exercise public
functions and wield power and authority under the State."
308
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Harlan continued,
authorize "legislation of a direct character, for the security of rights created
by the national Constitution. ' '309 Turning to the issues of the Slaughter-
House Cases, Harlan invoked "the obligation to protect the fundamental
privileges and immunities granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to
citizens residing in the several States. 310 In holding otherwise, Harlan
stated, the majority had undermined "the foundations upon which the
national supremacy has always securely rested.",311 He further asserted that
railroads, inns, and businesses operating public amusements were proper
party defendants under the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because they were
state-regulated businesses and not mere social actors.31 2 Just as Dred Scott
303 Id. at 18-19 ("If the principles of interpretation which we have laid down are correct, as we
deem them to be,... it is clear that the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of legislative
power made to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
304 See id. (explaining the Court's disagreement with congressional legislation that "declares that
all persons shall be entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and
places of public amusement").
305 See id. at 24 (concluding that "an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary
servitude").
306 Id. at 57 (Harlan, J. dissenting).30 71 d. at 36, 46.30
1 Id. at 36.
'09 Id. at 57.
310 Id. at 54-57.
311 Id.
312 See id. at 58-59 ("In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of places of public
amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the State, because they are charged with duties to the
public, and are amenable, in respect of their duties and functions, to governmental regulation.").
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had "overruled the action of two generations," so too the majority's
undercutting of Congress "made a new departure in the workings of the
federal government.
3 13
Both Dred Scott and the Civil Rights Cases struck federal laws-first
the Missouri Compromise and later the Civil Rights Act of 1875-that had
established national anti-discrimination standards. The Court augmented
its own authority at the expense of congressional initiatives meant to
prevent the spread of discrimination. In the Civil Rights Cases, an
antebellum notion of federalism, restraining Congress from protecting
individual rights, trumped petitioners' demands for the protection of
elementary human dignity. The Court thus gave its institutional
imprimatur to a racially binary America, which for a brief time Congress
had tried to bring to an end. The federal government soon became
intransigent in the face of a growing number of Jim Crow laws. In recent
years, the Court has further eroded legislative prerogatives intended to
enforce federally recognized civil rights.
C. Contemporary Judicial Restraints on Congressional Authority
Late nineteenth century cases, like Cruikshank and the Civil Rights
Cases, significantly eroded congressional Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority. Even if congressmen had the will to
pass additional laws commensurate with the country's founding principles,
they were likely to be overturned. The effort to integrate the American
Creed into enforceable federal laws, which the Supreme Court had
obstructed following Reconstruction, had to await passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
The civil rights era of the 1960s increased Americans' awareness of
minority rights. Given this cultural change, the Court might have become
increasingly deferential to civil liberties laws passed pursuant to the
Reconstruction Amendments. To the contrary, in the 1990s, the Supreme
Court increasingly interfered with congressional policies. During the same
period, the Court augmented state sovereign immunity above federal
employment guidelines for the fair treatment of elderly and disabled
workers. The Court persisted in relying on post-Reconstruction precedents
to defeat statutes dealing with core national rights.
City of Boerne v. Flores, for example, falls within the continuum of
cases that erect barriers against Congress's ability to impose federal civil
rights norms on state actors.314 Not only had the Court limited the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment to state actions since the Civil Rights Cases, as
of late it also immunized states' officials from liability; thereby, it entirely
313 d. at 57.314 See supra Part V.
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closed certain avenues for federal relief. Boerne held that Congress had
exceeded its Section 5 power in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA).3 5 The majority found the law to be neither congruent nor
proportional to any judicially recognized violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.316 The Act had been meant to prevent state infringement
against the free exercise of religion, which has an undeniable pedigree as
an inalienable right harkening back to the Declaration of Independence. 317
A bipartisan majority passed RFRA in response to the Supreme
Court's holding in Employment Division v. Smith.31 8 That case found
states could enforce laws of general applicability, such as drug
enforcement statutes, even when those laws restrained persons from
exercising their religion.319  Thus, according to Smith, Oregon had not
violated the Free Exercise Clause by punishing a devotee of the Native
American Church for the ritual use of peyote, which was a "controlled
substance" under state law.32°
RFRA meant to overrule Smith by reinstating a strict scrutiny standard
of review on state conduct that placed substantial burdens on individuals'
religious exercise. 32' The holding in Boerne-that the statute was
unconstitutional-came as a surprise because the incorporation doctrine
indicates that uniform standards against state infringement of religious
rights is a core responsibility of national government. The First
Amendment applies to the states through its incorporation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 5 of the latter grants Congress the
authority to protect religious practices from government interference.322 In
overturning the statute, the Court vastly increased its own power, finding
itself to be the only branch of government that can define what inalienable
rights the Fourteenth Amendment protects. It appears the Court
augmented its power as the final determinative authority of constitutional
interpretation at the expense of a democratic measure designed to protect
civil liberties.
Boerne implicitly rejected Katzenbach v. Morgan's assertion that
"[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is a positive grant of
legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment., 323 To the contrary, Boerne
315 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
316 Id. at 520, 536.
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000).
318 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 21 n.97, 44 (2003).
319 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
320 Id. at 877-82.
321 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
322 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
32 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966).
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denied that Section 5 granted Congress the authority to decide what
"constituted a substantive violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.,
324
Morgan made clear that Section 5 does not limit the legislative branch
"to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional. 325  In his
majority opinion, Justice Brennan explained that "[b]y including [Section]
5," the Reconstruction Congress "sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause. 32 6 This characterization
meant Congress could rely on its broad grant of enforcement authority to
identify appropriate policies needed for enacting regulations to achieve
legitimate constitutional aims.327  Acting in accordance with the
Declaration of Independence and Preamble principles, legislators could
remain disciplined in protecting fundamental rights while preventing
governmental infringements.
Instead of relying on Morgan's substantive interpretation of
enforcement authority, Boerne reached back to a Gilded Age precedent that
had undercut liberalizing efforts, reaffirming the Civil Rights Cases.
Boerne also supported its rationale through United States v. Harris, which
had found that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5
power when, in 1871, it criminalized all conspiracies meant to deprive
"any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges or immunities under the laws. 328 The 1871 statute
punished private violence "without reference to the laws of the State or
their administration by her officers., 329 Boerne relied on these cases for
the premise that Section 5 only gave Congress the enforcement authority to
remedy past patterns of state discrimination, but not to identify
fundamental constitutional rights in order to protect them. 330 Pursuant to
this rule, only laws congruent and proportional for remedying
unconstitutional state behavior can survive judicial scrutiny. 3 ' Applying
this standard, the Boerne Court diminished individuals' ability to seek
324 Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the
Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691,694 (2000).
321 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49.
326 Id. at 650.
327 Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), which established
the current scope of Necessary and Proper Clause authority).
328 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638-39
(1882). The popular name of the statute was the "Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871." See Archibald Cox,
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, Ill n.108
(1966).329 Harris, 106 U.S. at 640.
330 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's history
confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.").
131 Id. at 520, 530, 532.
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legal redress for violations of an essential aspect of fundamental American
liberty, the nationally recognized right to worship freely without
substantial state interference.
In asserting the exclusivity of its power to define substantive
Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Boerne Court denied that Section 5
granted Congress the authority to determine independently what laws are
necessary and proper to prevent state infringements against a First
Amendment right. Congress, the Court claimed, lacked the mandate "to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
States.332 The latter was predicated on the Court's presumed supremacy
in the interpretation of the Constitution. Beginning in 1803 with Marbury
v. Madison, the established principle has been that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution. 333  That
definition of judicial function is an abiding fact in our tripartite system of
governance.
A key problem with Boerne and its progeny is that they overextend the
hand of the judiciary into the realm of legislative policy. The notion that
Congress can play only a severely hampered role in determining and
safeguarding rights essential to the American heritage as free exercise is
contrary to what the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 revealed. Participants in those debates, which this
Article extensively discussed earlier, indicated that the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments were meant to reduce the judiciary's ability to
undermine the use of legislative power for the expansion of civil rights.
The legislature was to be primarily guided by the principles of the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble in establishing liberty
principles according to the people's will.334 Instead, Boerne conceived the
judiciary to be the supreme and only source for rights definitions, effacing
the people's ability to make its collective will known through their
representatives' enactments.
In fact, debates on both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
indicated a national decision to expand congressional authority rather than
to confine it to a mere remedial role. Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed out
that Boerne's remedial interpretation of congressional authority rests on
the mere fact that Congressman Bingham's final draft of the amendment
was less comprehensive sounding than the first draft.335 In Boerne, the
Court quoted Bingham's assertion that the final draft would grant Congress
"the power ... to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of
... Id. at 519.
333 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803)).
334 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 51 (1999).
335 Erwin Chemerinsky, Politics, Not History, Explains the Rehnquist Court, 13 TEMP. POL. &
Clv. RTs. L. REv. 647, 651 (2004).
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all the citizens of the Republic ... whenever the same shall be abridged or
denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State. 336 The majority erred,
however, in finding a law against state abridgement of religious freedom
was incongruous with Bingham's statement. Even the Slaughter-House
Cases' shallow interpretation of privileges and immunities, which listed
among these the First Amendment "right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of grievances, '337 would allow for congressional
intervention in state violation of religious rights. At the time of passing the
amendment, Representative Stevens forcefully argued that the amendment
would "allow[] Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, 3 8
likewise indicating that a federal remedy against any state interference with
the right to worship is a congruent and proportional use of Section 5
authority.
The Court's analytical error was to presume that it is the sole
determiner of what fundamental rights are protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cases like Boerne seem to conceive of no higher authority
than the Court. American heritage, on the other hand, posits primary
responsibility for identifying inalienable rights in the people who have a
say in government through their congressional representatives. The people
retain inalienable rights and do not give government the authority to limit
these rights except for the general welfare. It seems illogical, therefore, to
claim that the power to assess the nature of enumerated and unenumerated
rights resides exclusively in unelected government officials. A more
direct, immediate, and wide-ranging way for the people to act in their
interest is by electing officials who are politically accountable for their
policy choices. The judiciary's role in preventing majorities from
trampling the constitutional interests of minorities is inapplicable where
the legislation is designed to add safeguards of essential interests, like the
free exercise of religion.
United States v. Morrison further illustrates this diminished legislative
authority to identify fundamental rights and to pass laws protecting
them.339 The Court again found that Congress overstepped its legislative
Section 5 authority when it created a private cause of action under the
VAWA.340 As in Boerne, the Court predicated its decision on a reading of
Section 5 that only allowed Congress to respond to state wrongs after it
had conducted exhaustive evidentiary hearings producing proof that states
had abridged court-defined rights. Congress had, in fact, developed a
massive factual record before it enacted VAWA, finding a national
336 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522 (1997) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2542 (1866)).
331 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
338 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866)).
339 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000).
3 Id. at 605, 627.
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solution was critical because many states' responses to gender-based
violence were inadequate.34' Congress relied on a "mountain of data"
amassed through nine congressional hearings and four years worth of
gender task force reports from twenty-one states.342 A 5-4 majority of the
Court,343 nevertheless, found itself to be a better judge of the constitutional
appropriateness for the legislation than a bipartisan majority of Congress.
Just as in Boerne, the Morrison Court incorporated the state action
requirement from Harris and the Civil Rights Cases, rendering the
Fourteenth Amendment only applicable if a state violated a legally
cognizable private interest.344 The Court also found Cruikshank, which
derailed Congress's nineteenth century attempt to end racial violence, to be
an important precedent that supported the decision to strike down
VAWA.345 Jurisprudence which had dismantled Reconstruction now
provided a lynchpin for disemboweling the private remedy against gender-
based violence.
Morrison's premise-that Congress must answer to the Court for the
creation of an adequate record detailing state violations-conceived
Congress to function somewhat like an administrative agency or a
prosecutor acting against recalcitrant states.346 Congress is instead an
institution of the people's representatives who are institutionally
responsible for protecting basic liberties for the common good. If
Congress were required to amass a record of abuse from all states before it
could act to quell systemic abuses, then its ability to act quickly for the
general welfare would be severely hampered.
The most robust stance on supreme federal civil rights authority would
make Congress's determination of its Section 5 authority final in the same
way that the Supreme Court's interpretation of its Article III powers is
final. To be clear, this refers to legislation meant to protect constitutional
rights associated with human dignity, not statutes dealing with regulatory
matters like money laundering.
Under this robust model, to overturn a liberty enhancing law passed
pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority, a constitutional
amendment would be needed.347 This is similar to the use of the
'' Id. at 653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
34, Id. at 628-31.
343 Id. at 600 (majority opinion).
'4Id. at 621-23.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 283-84.
34 See Post & Siegel, supra note 318, at 13 (referencing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), where the Court "reasons about Section 5 legislation as if it were an
accusation, and as if states subject to its regulation were defendants in a lawsuit"). I am indebted to
Aviam Soifer for the agency analogy.
34' See U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
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amendment process as the only means of overturning the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution. It would be the people, then, not the
judiciary, who could determine whether laws purporting to protect
substantive due process or equal protection comport with the founding and
evolving principles of governance.
The advantage of this method is that it would favor democratic self-
governance. Its potential disadvantage is that it is likely to lead to
disagreements between legislative and judicial interpretations of the
Constitution. In order to avoid such a conflict between the branches,
Congress would need to respect judicial interpretation of the Constitution.
This can be achieved by allowing Congress to expand rights beyond the
Court's guidelines, but not to intrude on those the Court has identified, like
the right to privacy. Likewise, the Court would be able to identify rights,
but not to undermine Congress through judicial creations, like sovereign
immunity.
The congressional debates discussed earlier in this Article indicate that
many advocates of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments supported
plenary congressional powers over civil rights. The amendments'
supporters simply could not have anticipated the extent of judicial
interference following ratification, given that until 1866 only two Supreme
Court cases held federal statutes to be unconstitutional.34 8 They expected
that one of Congress's roles would be to identify practical ways of
achieving the central tenet of the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution: The protection of individual rights for the general welfare.349
Article 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment grant Congress the power to expand safeguards for critical
American rights. Legislative independence in identifying constitutional
rights, therefore, has a textual basis. The notion that the Court can contract
rights Congress has recognized by statute is a regressive form of
jurisprudence that runs counter to the country's avowed commitment to
"establish Justice" and "secure the Blessings of Liberty. '350  By
diminishing the American people's entitlement to file federal claims to
vindicate statutorily identified liberties, the Court strengthened state
sovereignty while stifling progressive measures. If the electorate disagrees
with its representatives' concept of protectable interests, it can vote them
out of office or pass a constitutional amendment.
Of course, if they were enabled to interpret the Constitution
independently, it is probable that some congressmen would abuse their
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths ... .
348 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
349 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 1987-88 (2006)
(discussing the paradigm case method of constitutional interpretation).
311 U.S. CONST. prmbl.
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new status. But the current situation, in which a five Justice majority of
the Supreme Court can strike a law like VAWA, which Congress found
constitutional after years of fact-gathering, is itself rife for cultivating
erroneous precedents. The idea that rights-expanding statutes can be
overturned by a simple majority of judges (or justices for that matter),
without the input of the electorate, is no consolation for women who find
state redress for domestic violence inadequate.35'
The strong form of this Article's proposal carries the risk of legislative
abuse rectified only through a drawn out amendment process or periodic
elections. It also differs drastically from the current model of judicial
352review. Indeed, the judiciary's judgments are often more objective
because they are less susceptible to political pressures than are the
legislative's judgments. The Court's constitutional analysis can therefore
be important for preventing the administration of inflexibly draconian
laws, like mandatory sentencing guidelines.353 It is therefore important to
develop a more moderate alternative, allowing Congress to enact
legislation to further the principles of the American Creed while preserving
judicial review. To that end, a more likely use of Section 5 power would
allow Congress to identify and pass civil rights laws that the Court could
later review through low level scrutiny. Congress could identify rights
even before the Court has flagged them. If the Court finds that a law is not
rationally related to the purported just aim, it can still overturn the statute.
A rational basis of review would enhance the federal government's
involvement in core purposes of national decision-making. This approach
to federalism would require the Court to be deferential toward
congressional policy when balancing the enhanced liberty protections
against state sovereignty concerns. As Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed
out, the Court's recent preference for state rights has been part of a
historical pattern, which was evident in the Civil Rights Cases, to rely on
federalism "to resist progressive federal efforts, especially in the areas of
civil rights and social welfare. 354  He recommends replacing the
351 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 151 (1999) ("States
are obligated to ensure equal protection for rape victims at... trials, whether we root that obligation in
the federal or state constitutions or the dictates of sound policy."); Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme
Court, The Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
57, 86 (2002) ("[E]ven in states that had dramatically reformed their rape and domestic violence
statutes, enforcement remained profoundly inadequate.").
352 See, e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, Which Constitution? Who Decides?: The Problem of Judicial
Supremacy and the Interbranch Solution, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1055, 1077-78 (2006); Richard Stith,
Securing the Rule of Law Through Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument for Comparative Law, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 401, 433 (2008); Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional
Niche in Affirmative Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1931, 1949 (2007).
311 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) (finding federal sentencing guidelines to be
advisory and reasonable deviation from them only subject to abuse of discretion appellate review).
3-4 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 6
(2008).
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formalistic approach to federalism, which prevented battered women from
filing suits in federal courts, with "a functional analysis of how to equip
each level of government with the authority to deal with social problems
and enhance liberty. 355
Under the approach advanced in this Article, the Court would have to
uphold any laws protecting fundamental rights so long as congressional
debates and hearings provide it with a rational basis to find that group
discrimination, violation of a political right, or infringement of a
fundamental interest should be addressed by a uniform federal law.356
Where Congress's purpose is to expand rights, the Court should go no
further than determining whether the statute is reasonably related to the
equal protection of liberties. The strict scrutiny standard should be left to
cases where Congress has undermined a Court-recognized right.
As for current jurisprudence, Morrison's fact-finding requirement
misconstrues the legislature's function by placing it under tutelage of the
judiciary rather than construing it to be a coequal branch bound by the
Preamble to the Constitution's statement of governmental purposes.357
Federal civil rights laws can apply to all states, even those with no history
of violating them. What is required is national policymaking that accords
with the historical expansion of American civil rights.
The Court's requirement that Congress demonstrate that it is
responding to a proven harm has much in common with the judicial
doctrines of standing and ripeness. But that methodology has little place in
the context of the legislature's typical policymaking which is meant to
identify, balance, and specify governmental programs. Public policy is not
predicated on the ripeness doctrine but on the popular will. Nowhere does
the Constitution provide states with the sovereign right to ignore uniform
federal standards for the protection of fundamental rights. To the contrary,
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with the
authority to pass laws to protect such rights.358 The Reconstruction
355 Id. at 8.
356 The initial recognition of this judicial scrutiny derives from footnote four of Carolene
Products. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). At the core of Justice
Stone's footnote lay the American tradition, often breached by self-interest though it was, of protecting
minorities against the whims of powerful majorities: "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry." Id. That statement was the fulcrum for future elevated scrutiny cases that
probed into whether individuals were unfairly treated for being members of an identifiable group.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1288 (2007).
357 See Calvin Massey, Two Zones of Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 15-16, 25-26 (2007) (discussing the Court's rationale
for striking down the Violence Against Women Act because evidence of gender-motivated crimes in
twenty-one states did not establish "evidence of a national problem").
358 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 ("The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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Congress included that legislative power to provide the constitutional
authority necessary to pass laws for the common good, making judicial
deference constitutionally imperative.
This allocation of power renders governance more efficient: Congress
has greater resources than the judiciary to evaluate social problems and
pass laws furthering liberty according to the nation's core principles.
Relying on the same restraint of congressional civil rights authority as
it did in Morrison, the Supreme Court went on to strike the state
compliance provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 35 9  The Court again raised its definitive voice in constitutional
definition-making above Congress's power to prevent arbitrary employer
conduct.36 ° In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, Justice O'Connor relied
on a textually dubious interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as a
source of sovereign immunity that allows states to abrogate national
standards of workplace decency.36'
The Court's principal concern was preventing federal overreaching
rather than safeguarding the interests of older Americans for whom the law
had provided redress against state ageism. 362  Rather than balancing
competing interests, the Court refused to analyze the relative value of
individual rights and state sovereign immunity.363 The majority did not so
much as hint at how the Fourteenth Amendment altered federalism and
359 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
360 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that Marbury "declared the basic principle
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"). While judicial
review is an essential feature of the American legal system, it is not a license for intruding on
congressional prerogatives to pass civil rights laws that are based on Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority and are rationally related to the goal of achieving the Preamble's mandate for the
government to protect fundamental rights for the general welfare. See supra Part I.C.
361 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72-73. For constitutional criticism of the Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201,
1213 (2001) ("Sovereign immunity allows the government to violate the Constitution or laws of the
United States without accountability."); Jackson, supra note 324, at 701 ("Not only does the Court
revert to an unjustifiably heroic mode of insisting on sovereign immunity as a first principle of
government, the Court also has mythologized and tried to unify the doctrines of sovereign immunity in
a way that is false to their more complex history."); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and
Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 819, 820 (1999). (arguing for the existence of constitutional state
sovereign immunity while stating that "the texts of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments simply do not
provide for such immunities and constitutional structure, while a useful aid to interpretation, is not
itself text"); William J. Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing
Congressional Power to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
235, 238 (2001) (arguing that "the Privileges or Immunities Clause authorizes Congress to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when acting to enforce individual rights
that Congress has been otherwise authorized to protect").
362 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (noting that ADEA, "through its broad restriction on the use of age
as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and practices than
would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard")
(emphasis added).
363 See id. at 78 (concluding that "Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity").
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augmented congressional authority to punish state infringements of
individual rights.364 The Amendment's ratification substantially increased
Congress's role in protecting people against state violations of their basic
interests.3 65 Kimel diminished the federal government's ability to punish
arbitrary treatment of a protected group.
A rational standard of review would have provided verifiable analysis
instead of whimsical reliance on the Eleventh Amendment. Under a more
deferential review, there seems to be nothing illegitimate about Congress's
decision to promote the "employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age. 366 That policy, in fact, seems to accord with the
Declaration of Independence's emphasis on equality. The Court's analysis
in Kimel, to the contrary, applied the rational basis standard to state rather
than federal action. It focused on a state's right to "discriminate on the
basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age
classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest., 367 Placing state prerogatives ahead of federal civil rights norms
turned the rational basis argument on its head, providing the Court with a
justification to decrease the supremacy of Section 5, the Fourteenth
Amendment's enforcement authority.
In his dissent to Kimel, Justice Stevens argued that the federal
government can legitimately rely on its authority to prohibit private and
public acts of discrimination committed in the labor market. 68 He further
reviewed the history of state sovereignty, finding that the framers
established a structure of federalism that did not render the judiciary "the
constitutional guardian of . . . state interests. 369 In Stevens's view, the
Court usurped the legislative branch's lawmaking discretion.37°
On the heels of Kimel, the Court invalidated a provision of the
Americans with Disabilities Act in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett.371 This was a law that President George H. W. Bush
likened to the Declaration of Independence, hoping that "the Americans
with Disabilities Act [would) . . . be a model for the choices and
opportunities of future generations around the world., 372  Given this
364 See Chemerinsky, supra note 335, at 1213 (noting that "the state employees in Kimel... have
federal rights, but due to sovereign immunity, no remedies").365 See supra Part 1V.C.
366 29 U.S.C. § 621o(b) (2000) ("It is ... the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment.").
367 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
368 Id. at 92-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).369 1d. at93.37 0 Id. at 96.
371 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
372 Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1165, 1166 (July 26, 1990).
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principled statement of purpose, the law was a deliberate effort to expand
opportunities for the handicapped. Under my deferential model, the
constitutionality of this law should have been reviewed under a rational
basis test because the statute expanded liberty rights.
Garrett found that Congress lacked the Section 5 power to create a
private cause of action for disabled workers to sue their state employers for
failing to make reasonable work-related accommodations.373 Congress was
thereby precluded from protecting workers despite extensive evidence of
states' discriminatory conduct against disabled employees.374 Drawing on
its reasoning in Boerne, the Court decided that "[t]he legislative record of
the ADA ... simply fail[ed] to show that Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the
disabled. 3 75 The Court allowed all states, even those Congress had found
violated national standards of employment decency, to police their own
conduct without having to comply with national employment standards.
The ADA was enacted, in large part, to enforce Fourteenth Amendment
authority to establish a nationally comprehensive mandate against
workplace discrimination. 376 Rather than deferring to this congressional
civil rights policy, the Court gave states a pass by instituting a low
threshold of review for their treatment of the handicapped.
An earlier case, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, had, in
fact, established a rational relation scrutiny for a city ordinance affecting
the handicapped, but that case resulted in a victory for the disabled.377
Discrimination against the handicapped based on stereotypes rightly did
not survive rational basis scrutiny in Cleburne, and expansion of their
rights through the ADA should have been found to be within Congress's
Section 5 power to prevent "irrational prejudice. 378 Garrett, on the other
hand, disregarded the Reconstruction Amendment's emphasis on federal
supremacy in matters of civil rights law, relying on a low threshold of
scrutiny to tolerate state employers' discriminatory conduct against the
disabled.3
79
The Garrett Court, in effect, gave license to states, even those that
lacked adequate protections for disabled employees, to engage in federally
cognizable harms. Congress's assessment of how best to protect the
general welfare did not dissuade the Court from intervening on behalf of
... Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
314 See id at 391-424 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (listing examples of discriminatory conduct by state).
... Id. at 368 (majority opinion).
376 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
377 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). On Garrett's selective
misapplication of the Cleburne standard, see Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better
Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1292-93 (2003).
378 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
379 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2001).
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the states. The Court effectively placed states' sovereignty interests above
the equal protection of liberty interests.
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs produced a
different outcome. While the Court had rejected Congress's authority to
prevent state perpetrated age and disability discrimination, in Hibbs it
upheld a private cause of action against states violating the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). 380 The Court deferred to Congress explicitly because
the statute prohibited gender discrimination. 381 The decision relied on the
intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to gender stereotype cases. 382
This was distinguishable from Garrett and Kimel because those cases
concerned disability and age respectively, to which the Court has applied
only a rational basis of review. However, that distinction did not explain
why in Morrison the Court did not uphold the VAWA on the basis of
intermediate scrutiny. The VAWA was intended to combat widespread
gender discrimination in state courtrooms, a goal that seems as important
as providing medical leave to take care of sick relatives.383
The Court might have avoided the contradiction in Hibbs and
Morrison by focusing on whether the statutes involved were rational uses
of congressional Section 5 power to further American freedom. Both
FMLA and VAWA were liberty enhancing laws. And judicial deference to
congressional decision-making would have enabled Congress to enforce
the equality principles asserted idealistically in the Declaration of
Independence and pragmatically in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Instead, in Morrison the Court acted as a super-legislature,
overturning bipartisan political effort, while in Hibbs it chose to give
Congress a pass.
In another recent case abrogating state immunity, the Court's rationale
likewise focused on state actions rather than congressional plenary power
to safeguard civil liberties. Tennessee v. Lane upheld Title II of the ADA's
provision for private damages arising from discrimination in the access to
court facilities. 384 The Court invoked a standard of review approaching
strict scrutiny because a fundamental right of access to the courts was
involved.385 The positive outcome in this case cannot be reconciled with
Boerne, where the Court struck a law that protected religious freedom.3 86
Both access to courts and free exercise of religion are subject to heightened
380 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
3
' Id. at 736.
382 Id.
3
13 j. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End Relationships, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 407, 435 (2003) (stating congressional purpose behind VAWA).
384 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 525-29 (2004).
385 Id. at 529; see also id. at 522-23 (stating that the federal statute "seeks to enforce a variety of.
basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial
review").386 See supra text accompanying notes 314-17.
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scrutiny review, so the analysis should have been similar. These are both
cases dealing with liberty enhancements that, since the Reconstruction,
have been constitutionally subject to congressional authority.
Even though Hibbs and Lane upheld federal civil rights laws, they
remained committed to a limited view of legislative authority. The Court
found that Congress cannot stamp out discrimination without the Court's
prior imprimatur of constitutionally recognized rights.387  And that
approach hampers Congress from independently identifying fundamental
American rights and passing necessary and proper laws to protect them.
Hibbs and Lane do provide some guidance for Congress, indicating that in
order to pass constitutional muster, civil rights statutes must safeguard
those rights the Court previously recognized to be sufficiently important or
fundamental. Those cases, however, give little support to the premise that
the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress the independent authority to
identify core concerns about the rights of American citizens and to pass
reasonable laws to protect such rights.388
By ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, the people granted Congress
authority to establish national standards for state imposed or condoned
inequalities. The judiciary's role is to strike any law lacking a rational
relation to the legitimate purpose of protecting individual rights. However,
it undermines the underlying notion of representational democracy for
judges to prohibit lawmakers from protecting identified rights retained by
the people.389
VI. CONCLUSION
From the Revolutionary Era through post-Civil War Reconstruction
and into the present, protecting essential rights has remained one of the
government's foremost imperatives. The Declaration of Independence's
assertion that everyone is created equal with the same inalienable rights
and the Preamble to the Constitution's mandate to "promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty" applies to the federal
government as a whole. With the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, congressional enforcement authority expanded, but the
Court resisted that constitutional revolution. Recent cases have continued
to resort to the narrow view of congressional civil rights authority.
Rehnquist Court decisions, such as Boerne and Morrison, do not
reflect the Reconstruction Amendment's grant of legislative enforcement
authority to promulgate policies reasonably calculated to protect
fundamental rights. The system of checks and balances does not grant the
117 Lane, 541 U.S. at 533; Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 740 (2003).
388 See supra text accompanying notes 243-49.
389 See Massey, supra note 357, at 38.
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Supreme Court a monopoly on the definition of constitutionally protectable
interests.
The Court and Congress have equally important roles to play in
enhancing liberty interests. The Court's principal role, as the final arbiter
of constitutional meaning, enables it to overturn inequitable legislation.
Legislative constriction of Court established rights, such as the right to
racial intermarriage, warrants strict judicial scrutiny.
However, where Congress is acting to protect fundamental rights, the
judiciary's role is to determine whether Congress had a legitimate reason
for passing the law. Where such a rationale exists, the statute should not
be overturned even when the corrective legislation prohibits discrimination
against groups, such as the disabled and elderly, to whom the Court applies
a rational basis standard of review. After all, congressional authority to
protect liberty rights is explicitly constitutional, while judicial standards of
review are not.
390
390 Fallon, Jr., supra note 356, at 1268.
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